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f r o m  t h e  e d I t o r
dear Hemisphere readers:
The Kimberly Green latin american and caribbean center is pleased to be partnering with florida international 
university’s institute for public management and community Service (ipmcS) to provide our readers with an in-
depth look at the results of 30 years of reforms in latin america and the caribbean. 
research on democratic transition and the challenges of its consolidation in latin america and the caribbean 
is vast, but an area that has not received the attention it merits is the process of subnational decentralization and 
economic development. The first generation of democratic reforms focused on institutional design and elections but 
did not address the structural impediments to consolidation, many of which persist at the local level. proponents 
believed decentralization would help consolidate democratic rule by devolving power and authority from corrupt 
and inefficient central governments. despite some good outcomes, issues of transparency, economic development 
and institutional capacity remain unresolved. more academic and policy work is required to help understand and 
address the key gaps.
This issue of hemisphere serves as a platform for discussion of this important topic. ipmcS, one of the leading 
centers in the uS for the study of local governance in latin america and the caribbean, has collected an impressive 
group of scholars and practitioners from the region to analyze the unfinished business of consolidating effective, 
transparent local government institutions and regulatory processes. 
Special thanks to cristina rodríguez-acosta, assistant director of ipmcS, for serving as guest editor. her depth 
of knowledge of the topic and network of experts and contacts in the field of local governance have been invaluable 
in editing this issue. i am grateful to her and the contributors for their participation in this issue of hemisphere and 
for their commitment to where governance matters most – at the subnational level. 
frank o. mora
director
Kimberly Green latin american and caribbean center
florida international university
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f r o m  t h e  G u e s t  e d I t o r
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw latin america’s transition from dictatorial regimes to democracy and with it, a 
clear impetus for promoting citizen participation, transparency, greater accountability and good governance in most 
countries. many of these countries enacted new political constitutions and economic reforms to try to modernize 
stagnant economies and promote social inclusion and economic development. Their administrations saw political, fiscal 
and administrative reforms as essential to improving public service delivery and making governments more accountable 
to their people. 
more than 30 years later, many scholars, politicians and citizens worry that decentralization has not brought the 
improvements it promised, and concerns are growing about a possible slowdown – if not a reversal – of the process. in 
this hemisphere issue, the institute for public management and community Service at florida international university 
has asked a wide range of observers to provide brief analyses of where we are now and how decentralization reforms can 
be deepened. 
in our main article, professor allan rosenbaum notes that many forces are behind the decentralization process, 
including the belief that strong local governments have the capacity to influence local, regional and national economic 
development. citing the united States’ experience with decentralization, rosenbaum explores the ability of local 
governments to be a source of innovation and economic development and offers six recommendations for building 
effective administrations.
marcelo Giugale, Senior director at the World Bank Global practice for macroeconomics and fiscal management, 
poses the question everybody has on their minds after 30 years of decentralization policies around the world and, in 
particular, latin america: has it worked? how can we know? What evidence do we have? The results, he argues, are 
mixed, but successful cases share elements in common: innovation, technology and low debt. 
my own contribution is an overview of some of the political, fiscal and administrative reforms in the region, noting 
the fragmentation of policy implementation in many countries as well as the fiscal disparities and overreliance of 
subnational governments on fiscal transfers from the central government. lack of revenue autonomy is accompanied 
by insufficient expenditure autonomy at the subnational level. after three decades of reforms, the impetus toward 
decentralization seems to be losing steam.
The importance of cultural values and historical traditions to citizen participation and the pace of decentralization 
is addressed by Víctor J. flecha, the head of a prominent paraguayan NGo who has worked on issues related to 
decentralization in several latin american countries. flecha also notes the sluggish adoption and implementation of 
decentralization policies.
a series of articles on the decentralization experiences of several countries in the americas further develop these 
general arguments. ilyana albarrán argues that while mexico’s decentralization has resulted in more decision-making 
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authority at the local level and increased participation by allowing communities to manage projects, many problems 
remain (e.g., inequality, corruption, collusion with drug cartels). These problems call into question the ability of 
decentralization to bring about less corrupt and more accountable governments. 
in another article on mexico, heidi Smith reviews the administrative structure of municipal debt in that country, its 
implications for local economies, and the reasons why municipalities in mexico acquire debt. her discussion includes 
examples and alternatives for public officials to make levels of subnational debt more sustainable. 
pablo Sanabria, analyzing decentralization in colombia, explores aspects of intergovernmental relations and 
fund transfers. in addition to a review of the challenges decentralization has brought with it, he ends by offering a 
compelling agenda in which strengthening human capital at the local level is one of the key elements. 
Gretha Burchard, for her part, provides an overview of Brazil’s cyclical relationship between centralization and 
decentralization, reviewing reforms in specific sectors such as health, education and social welfare. 
The successes and challenges of decentralization in chile are the subject of the article by José inostroza lara and 
Javier fuenzalida aguirre. chile’s new president faces a series of challenges to deepen and strengthen the reforms 
proposed by the presidential commission on decentralization. 
finally, professor daniel cravacuore of the National university of Quilmes, argentina writes about the dangers of 
recentralization and the need for all stakeholders to defend decentralization at the risk of becoming irrelevant. 
in presenting these articles for consideration and debate, fiu’s institute for public management and community 
Service is proud to contribute to the continuing discussion of the legacy and the future of decentralization in latin 
america. 
cristina a. rodríguez-acosta
assistant director
institute for public management and 
community Service
florida international university 
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t
he past half-century 
has witnessed 
numerous attempts 
to build more 
democratic and 
prosperous societies through 
governmental and economic 
reform. in some parts of the 
world, these efforts have been 
transformative, with governments 
moving from authoritarian, one-
party states to relatively pluralistic, 
democratic ones. a number of 
countries have also been the 
scenes of dramatic and, in some 
cases, successful economic reform. 
underlying many of the political 
and economic reforms that have 
captured headlines around the 
world has been a widespread 
movement toward decentralization 
and the strengthening of local 
government. 
many forces have driven this 
movement, ranging from local 
demands for more responsive, 
participatory and democratic 
grassroots governance to the 
efforts of major international 
organizations and national 
aid agencies to encourage the 
strengthening of local government 
as a means to institutionalize more 
democratic practices in countries 
undergoing political and economic 
transformation. more recently, 
these efforts have been guided by 
a growing belief that strong local 
government has the capacity to 
be an important factor in local, 
regional and national economic 
development. Nowhere has this 
concern for decentralization and the 
strengthening of local government 
been more at the center of reform 
efforts than in latin america. 
Such initiatives have not been 
confined to latin america, of course, 
nor are they limited to the past few 
decades. arguably, the first real effort 
to implement decentralization as a 
means to facilitate both democratic 
and economic development began 
with the creation of the united States 
nearly 250 years ago. Since that 
time, many countries have sought to 
institutionalize decentralized systems 
of government and create local 
governmental capacity to encourage 
economic and political development. 
a brief review of some of this 
experience, both in latin america 
and elsewhere, provides useful 
insights for better understanding 
what will and won’t work and why, 
as well as the likely consequences of 
particular reform strategies.
Local government:  
the us experience
The united States, in all 
probability, possesses the most 
highly developed subnational/
local government system of any 
country in the world. in addition 
to its 50 state governments, the 
uS has approximately 89,000 local 
governments. about 38,000 of these 
are general, or multi-purpose, city, 
county and township governments, 
and 51,000 are special, often single-
purpose, local governments. all are 
independent, have taxing authority 
and, in many cases, a considerable 
degree of autonomy within the 
geographic sphere in which they 
operate. in terms of function, 
the 51,000 special-purpose local 
governments engage in activities 
as diverse as controlling and/or 
eradicating mosquitos, providing 
public education to the nation’s 
children, or wide ranging and 
significant urban planning and/or 
transportation initiatives. often, 
local governments have overlapping 
jurisdictions, several of which can 
impact citizens at once. 
in certain respects, the high level 
of governmental decentralization 
in the united States is a direct 
result of the circumstances under 
which the country was established: 
rebellion against a centralized and 
authoritarian system in england 
by 13 relatively independent and 
separate colonies which, in some 
cases, had very different economic 
Local Government as a source of political and economic development:
What Can We Learn from past experience 
in Latin america and elsewhere?
By Allan Rosenbaum
f e a t u r e
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bases and, in many instances, 
did not really trust each other. 
consequently, the constitution 
drafted by the country’s founders 
gave great discretion to what were 
to become the initial 13 states and 
sought to limit the power of the 
national government. The new 
constitution mentioned nothing 
about municipal government, 
leaving it to the states to address that 
matter. in the 200-plus years since 
the founding of the uS, individual 
states have approached the issue of 
local government in different ways. 
Nevertheless, local government in 
the united States has flourished and 
continues to exercise great influence 
over public service delivery. 
one gets an especially good 
sense of the significance of local 
government in the uS system 
by putting it in comparative 
perspective. africa, for example, has 
about 15,000 local governments. 
Without counting the informal 
village councils found in china, 
pakistan and india, asia has about 
26,000 local governments, and 
latin america 17,000. This adds 
up to a total of approximately 
58,000 local governments in 
latin america, asia and africa 
combined, as opposed to 89,000 
in the uS. moreover, subnational 
governments in the uS – state and 
local – historically have served as the 
source of much policy and political 
innovation for the nation as a whole.
The ability of local governments 
to be a source of policy innovation 
and economic development is 
based upon two factors: first, the 
wide-ranging power and authority 
given to uS local governments and, 
second, their equally wide-ranging 
ability to levy taxes and assess fees 
and charges. Virtually all uS local 
governments have considerable 
capacity to impose property taxes. 
many also have the authority to 
impose sales taxes and, in some 
instances, even income taxes. This 
authority comes from their state 
governments, which also give most 
local governments in the united 
States substantial leeway to impose 
charges and fees on everything from 
collecting garbage to operating 
parks and issuing licenses. in 2010, 
for example, uS local governments 
collected more than $1.4 trillion 
in general revenue: $430 billion 
in property taxes, $323 billion in 
charges and fees, $140 billion in 
sales taxes and other revenues, and 
$544 billion in intergovernmental 
transfers from state and national 
governments.
one consequence of the 
substantial revenue raised at the 
local level is that uS state and 
local govenments, when taken 
together, are many times larger 
than the national government. for 
the past 65 years, the uS national 
government has operated with 
about 2 million civilian employees. 
another half million americans are 
employed by the uS postal Service 
and another million and a half by 
the nation’s military and security 
services. in contrast, state and local 
governments employ between 15 
and 19 million people. 
The sheer number of individuals 
involved in local government is 
an important factor in dispersing 
political power in the uS. almost 
all local governments elect between 
five and 15 executive officers and/
or councilpeople, and some as many 
as 50 or 60. moreover, in addition 
to the large number of individuals 
elected to local government offices, 
many others hold appointed 
positions designed to engage 
citizenry in local government 
activities. Virtually every uS local 
government appoints citizens to 
various boards and committees. in 
the case of large local governments, 
anywhere from 200 to 1,000 
individuals might serve on locally 
appointed citizen bodies which, in 
some cases, have decision-making 
authority regarding the expenditure 
of hundreds of millions of dollars.
one area of policy activity in 
which uS local governments are 
especially likely to draw upon citizen 
boards is the field of economic 
development, often through 
partnerships with prominent local 
business leaders. in some cases, 
the focus is on finding jobs for the 
unemployed and underemployed; 
in others, it is to encourage and 
support the creation of new 
businesses and economic enterprises. 
in yet other instances, the purpose 
is to lure business and industry from 
other cities, states and countries. 
frequently, these efforts receive 
significant financial support from 
local and/or state governments. 
in many cases, the goal is small 
business development, which, in 
recent decades, has become the 
leading source of new jobs in the uS 
economy.
The rest of the world
one important reason for the 
movement toward decentralization 
has been general disillusionment 
with centralized governments and 
economic systems. The collapse 
of the Soviet union gave further 
impetus to this development, 
but decentralization was already 
contributing to reshape latin 
america. in the 1960s, most 
countries in the region were 
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governed by authoritarian 
and, often, highly centralized 
dictatorships, both military and 
civilian. many of these dictatorships 
began to collapse due to their 
own economic inefficiency and 
authoritarianism in the late 1970s 
and 80s. That trend gave rise to 
growing opposition to centralized 
governments from within 
individual countries and among the 
international community. 
The dispersal of political power 
and the emergence of pluralist 
political systems and civil society 
have been among the main concerns 
of the decentralization movement 
of the past four decades. This 
movement has succeeded in many 
important ways. Just 40 years 
ago, for example, less than 10 of 
the world’s 45 largest countries 
had elected local government 
officials. today, almost all of them 
do. in latin america, only three 
governments had elected local 
officials 30 years ago. today, they are 
the rule everywhere except cuba. 
many countries have even initiated 
regional governments, often elected, 
where not so long ago few or none 
existed.
Nevertheless, there are still parts 
of the world where the movement 
toward decentralization and local 
government has not had a big 
impact. particularly notable in this 
regard are the middle east and 
central asia, where, despite some 
decentralization initiatives, the 
kind of significant developments 
that have occurred in other parts of 
the world have yet to emerge. Some 
countries have also taken a step 
back from both decentralization 
and democratization. russia 
especially stands out for the retreat 
from decentralization under putin’s 
leadership. But russia is not alone 
in this regard; colombia, once the 
leader of the decentralization effort 
in latin america, has witnessed 
significant efforts during the past 
decade to recentralize governmental 
authority and power. South africa 
too made significant progress 
toward decentralization under its 
first post-apartheid governments, 
only to see recentralization creep 
back in recent years. 
The case for local government
The question of why major 
decentralization initiatives have 
occurred in many parts of the world 
during the past several decades 
can be answered in many ways. 
certainly, one important reason 
is a desire for greater grassroots 
democracy and citizen participation. 
The drive to improve service delivery 
has also been an important driving 
force and, more recently, attention 
has been directed at the possible 
role of decentralization in reducing 
inequality. another explanation 
for encouraging decentralization 
has to do with its potentially 
significant role in more general 
efforts to promote local economic 
development.
in terms of promoting democracy 
and citizen participation, 
institutional efforts go beyond 
the election of local officials and 
include participatory budgeting, 
greater public involvement in 
strategic planning activities, and 
the establishment of local open 
records laws. in much of latin 
america, cities have experimented 
with decentralization in an effort to 
enhance citizen participation. one 
obstacle has been the fact that, in 
many instances, the emerging local 
governments have very little control 
over or capacity to raise revenue. 
one dramatic exception to this 
latin american pattern is Bolivia, 
which has been extremely successful 
in its attempts at decentralization, 
in part because significant revenue 
decentralization has accompanied 
political decentralization. for 
hundreds of years, a relatively 
small elite of european origin 
monopolized the nation’s political 
and economic power, land and 
wealth, marginalizing the majority 
indigenous population through 
policies that denied it fundamental 
human and political rights. in 
1994, under a relatively conservative 
government, Bolivia enacted a 
popular participation law that 
did two important things: first, 
it established many new local 
governments in areas where none 
had existed and, equally important, 
it provided local governments with 
substantial financial resources, 
earmarking 20% of the national 
budget for this purpose. Second, 
and equally significant, it created 
strong institutional mechanisms 
to ensure the participation of the 
country’s indigenous population in 
local government. This legislation, 
which played a major role in 
strengthening local government 
in Bolivia, has helped encourage 
dramatic political transformation 
over the past quarter century.
Similar, if less dramatic, 
situations have occurred in other 
latin american countries. in 
numerous instances, emerging local 
governments have served as the 
vehicles through which opposition 
political parties have organized 
and begun to compete seriously 
for national leadership, changing 
the basic dynamic of the political 
situation in numerous countries. 
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The local government movement 
has provided opportunities for 
many new organizations to develop, 
especially NGos, with profound 
consequences for democratic 
development. a case in point 
is chile, where internationally 
supported local governance 
initiatives facilitated the emergence 
of chilean civil society and 
significantly hastened the end of the 
pinochet dictatorship. 
The second major issue driving 
the decentralization movement 
is the question of public service 
delivery. The results of such efforts 
appear to be mixed. Some analysts 
– Shah, Thompson and Zou 
included – make a strong argument 
that decentralization has improved 
public service delivery. others note 
that political decentralization (in 
the sense of local elections and 
civil society mobilization) has not 
always implied adequate financial 
capacity. moreover, in most cases 
where substantial financial resources 
have been made available to local 
governments, they frequently 
take the form of transfer funds 
from national governments. local 
governments often have only very 
limited control and discretion 
over the use of these funds and, 
in more than a few cases, national 
governments habitually ignore 
legislation requiring them to transfer 
funds to local governments.
especially in Western 
democracies, where local 
governments have a strong record 
of success, such governments have 
had a great deal of autonomy in 
levying and raising taxes, issuing 
bonds for capital construction, 
imposing fees for services, and other 
activities central to their ability to 
deliver services effectively. in those 
cases where it appears that the 
quality of services has declined with 
decentralization, it is often because 
Enrique Peña Nieto gives his speech during the First Citizen Summit organized by civil society in Mexico City on May 22, 2012. More than 300 organizations 
participated in the summit, which presented a list of proposals to the country’s presidential candidates. ALFREDO ESTRELLA/AFP/Getty Images.
14844_SIPA_LACC-hemisphere-magazine.indd   10 7/21/15   3:35 PM
Hemisphere Volume 24 11
feature
of decreased national government 
allocations to the local governments 
with the responsibility for delivering 
the service involved. 
reducing inequality has 
been another growing focus of 
decentralization efforts, especially 
over the past decade. results in 
this area, too, have been mixed. 
Some countries – Brazil, china 
and poland among them – have 
focused on both encouraging 
governmental decentralization 
and raising the basic income of 
their citizenry. other countries, 
including chile, have attempted to 
improve the quality of education 
while encouraging political 
decentralization. it is not clear 
that such initiatives have produced 
any significant movement toward 
reducing income or wealth 
inequality. in fact, some of the 
same countries – Brazil and chile 
– have made significant reductions 
in poverty but seen inequality grow. 
The same phenomenon has been 
true in china, where the emergence 
of decentralized government 
(if not decentralized political 
power and control) over the past 
three or four decades has helped 
produce extraordinary economic 
development while exacerbating 
inequality. Thus, as large urban 
populations have become wealthy, 
the income and wealth gap between 
them and rural areas of the country 
has grown significantly.
The fourth point, the relationship 
between decentralization and 
economic development, is one that 
has not been adequately explored 
and, consequently, is often not well 
understood. although research on 
the subject has produced mixed 
results, it may well be the major 
benefit of the decentralization 
movement. Some quantitative 
analyses using World Bank and 
other data conclude that increasing 
emphasis on local government 
and decentralization produces 
positive economic results, but 
other researchers point to similar 
studies that conclude the opposite. 
one basic reality holds true 
regarding the relationship between 
decentralization and economic 
development: the wealthier the 
region of the world, the greater 
the reliance upon subnational and 
local governments for delivery of 
important public services.
When taken together as a 
group, wealthy countries devote 
significant resources to subnational 
government as a proportion 
of government expenditures 
and public employees. The 
differences between rich and 
poor countries are dramatic in 
this regard, with the percentage 
of all public expenditures and 
public employment found at the 
subnational level ranging from 
40%-60% in the world’s wealthiest 
countries to 10% in the poorest 
ones. in the uS, canada, Western 
europe and Japan, the majority 
of all public expenditures and 
public employees are found at the 
subnational level of government. 
The general pattern is reflected in 
the east asian countries (china, 
South Korea, malaysia, etc.), 
which have the next highest levels 
of economic development and the 
second greatest commitment to 
subnational government in terms 
of proportion of government staff 
and funding. in latin america, 
about 20% of both government 
employees and expenditures are 
at the subnational level. among 
african countries, generally the 
world’s least developed, the figure 
is 10%.
china illustrates this point in 
a dramatic way. Beginning in the 
early 1970s and extending into the 
1980s, china made major efforts to 
decentralize government authority 
and national economic resources. 
one result of this is that in china 
today, 80% of all state-owned 
industries are, in fact, owned by local 
governments and not by the national 
government. The local authorities 
have enabled and supported the 
capacity of those industries for 
economic development, leading to a 
great flourishing of china’s economy. 
Whatever china’s limitations in the 
area of democratic development, 
the past three decades of the 
decentralization of governmental (if 
not political) authority have produced 
extraordinary economic results.
The underlying reason for this is 
relatively simple: local economic 
development requires local 
capacity to support and sustain 
it. an important prerequisite 
for an effective private sector is, 
inevitably, an effective public 
sector. it is the public sector that 
provides the infrastructure and 
the critical resources necessary 
to support local economic 
development activities: adequate 
transportation facilities, water and 
electricity, a competent workforce, 
and a supportive legal framework 
(including everything from 
building and zoning requirements 
to local business regulatory 
policy). These are all matters that 
are most effectively dealt with, and 
most appropriately shaped and 
managed, at the local level. to do 
so effectively, however, requires 
significant local capacity in terms 
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Conference participants from Ecuador and Colombia during a networking session at Florida International University’s XX Inter-American Conference of 
Mayors: “Building Sustainable, Equitable and Smart Cities: New Challenges for Latin America” held at the Hilton Miami Downtown Hotel from June 
9-12, 2014.  FELIPE SOTO.
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of authority and autonomy, 
trained personnel and adequate 
fiscal resources.
six recommendations for building 
effective local government
as noted at the outset, efforts to 
build and strengthen democratic 
local governance have been under 
way for some time in many 
countries. an increasing body of 
knowledge exists about this topic, 
with the most important lessons 
learned including the following:
1) accountability and 
transparency are essential for 
citizen confidence 
Throughout the world, citizens 
are increasingly demanding 
accountability and transparency 
from their governments. This is 
especially true at the local level, 
where confidence in government 
is directly related both to the 
responsiveness of government 
to the needs of citizens and its 
openness to citizen participation and 
involvement. local governments in 
many parts of the world, given their 
status as relatively new institutions, 
have the opportunity to set a new 
standard of excellence in terms of 
accountability and transparency and, 
in so doing, help reverse the growing 
trend of citizen disillusionment with 
government institutions.
2) Citizen empowerment is a 
prerequisite for effective local 
governance
one of the greatest virtues of 
local government is its closeness to 
the people it serves. all too often, 
however, only part – frequently, 
a minority – of the people being 
governed are effectively involved 
in, or in a position to influence, 
their local governments. This is a 
problem that especially affects the 
poor, undermining the effectiveness 
of local government as a democratic 
institution and generator of 
needed economic development. 
it is critical that efforts to build 
and strengthen local government 
include major initiatives to 
encourage the empowerment of all 
citizens – especially the poor and 
the marginalized. as experience in 
many highly developed countries 
has shown, the failure to undertake 
such initiatives will have significant 
costs, ranging from civil disorder 
to a decline in confidence in 
government.
3) recognize the centrality  
of an adequate and dependable 
revenue base
in transitional and developing 
countries, regional and local 
governments often have very limited 
revenue-raising capacity, making 
them highly dependent on central 
government subventions. as new 
demands are brought to bear, they 
become ever more reliant upon 
national governments to provide 
funding, either through routinized 
fund transfers or by specific 
appropriations. Such dependence 
inevitably limits the capacity of 
local governments to provide the 
services their citizens require and to 
play their full role in the process of 
democratic institution building. 
The authority and capacity to 
raise revenue, whether through 
imposing taxes and fees or 
incurring reasonable debt, is 
essential to building strong local 
governments, not just because 
revenue is a prerequisite for the 
provision of effective and adequate 
public services, but also because 
the raising of revenue ultimately 
forces local public officials to act 
more responsibly. public officials 
who impose taxes upon the people 
who vote them in or out of office 
are more likely to remain attentive 
to their constituents and behave 
responsibly. Without this authority, 
they remain dependent, giving 
them the luxury to act irresponsibly 
and pass important governing 
responsibility on to others.
4) Build coalitions with  
civil society
another important development 
during the past decade for those 
concerned about the future of 
democracy and good governance 
has been the emergence of civil 
society organizations. Both 
through their own independent 
activities and, increasingly, through 
their ability to influence other 
institutions, civil society and its 
representatives are beginning to 
shape the policies and actions of 
local and national governments in 
important ways. in many instances, 
local civil society organizations 
play important roles in assisting 
emerging local governments to 
identify and meet citizen’s service 
delivery needs.
Governments, both at the national 
and the local level, can create 
environments that are friendly 
and supportive of civil society 
growth or that retard and limit 
this development. Through the 
protection of such basic rights as 
freedom of speech, association and 
press, as well as a variety of specific 
legislative actions (including taxation, 
financial support and regulatory 
activity), national and local 
governments can have a profound 
impact on the ability of civil society 
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institutions to develop and flourish. 
When rivalry and conflict emerge 
between local governments and civil 
society organizations, especially as 
they compete for international donor 
funding, it harms all parties involved. 
5) strengthen local and central 
government partnerships
The emergence of local 
government has been one of the 
most notable achievements of the 
democratic institution building 
efforts of the past several decades. 
Grassroots activists, local and 
national leaders, and international 
organizations have all contributed 
to this outcome. over the past 
decade, however, many national 
governments have reduced their 
commitment to this movement. in 
most parts of the world, national 
governments, through enabling 
legislation and fiscal policies, shape 
the environment within which local 
governments operate and can either 
limit or encourage their capacity to 
act effectively. 
even the most permissive and 
supportive national government, 
if acting alone, cannot ensure 
meaningful decentralization. 
Significant local demand and 
concern must exist for the 
development and continuity of 
local government. This is especially 
so since the leaders of most 
centralized government are not, in 
truth, anxious to give up resources 
or the authority to control them. 
for political purposes, national 
leaders often speak of the need to 
encourage decentralization, build 
local government capacity and 
strengthen citizen participation, but 
all too often such statements gain 
meaning only when accompanied by 
strong and substantial pressure from 
the local community. finally, it is 
especially necessary to recognize that 
strengthening one or another level 
of government does not represent 
a “zero-sum game” in the sense 
that, if one level of government is 
enhanced, another will inevitably 
become weaker. indeed, many 
contemporary experiences suggest 
quite the opposite: When one level 
of government becomes stronger, 
pressure builds for other levels of 
government to follow suit.
6) recognize the complexity and 
fragility of reform 
Government reform is inevitably 
a complex and difficult process. 
it frequently involves negotiating 
among well-established interests 
with a strong need and/or desire 
to maintain existing practices. 
Such groups will often vigorously 
resist efforts to bring about 
system reform. in transitional and 
developing countries, the problem 
of institutionalizing reform can 
become even more complex. often, 
the institutions of government 
are simply not strong enough to 
implement significant reforms. in 
other instances where reforms are 
implemented, the pressure to revert 
to past arrangements and practices is 
often strong. 
The process of institutional reform 
can be further complicated by the 
fact that many of the organizations 
that support and encourage such 
efforts frequently provide aid only in 
the short term. advocates for reform 
frequently leave the scene much too 
soon, giving those eager to limit or 
avoid reform the opportunity to 
do so with little or no resistance. 
in other instances, economic or 
political circumstances beyond 
the control of the participants in 
any reform process complicate 
and undermine even well-planned 
and organized reform initiatives. 
consequently, it is crucial that those 
involved in the process of building 
and/or reforming the institutions of 
local governance recognize that such 
efforts require both patience and a 
long-term commitment. 
in conclusion, while the united 
States remains one of the most 
politically decentralized countries 
in the world, other countries have 
begun to take significant steps 
in this direction, introducing 
local elections and strengthening 
municipal institutions. driving 
many of these developments is an 
underlying belief that dispersing 
political power and emphasizing 
local service delivery are important 
steps in building and strengthening 
democratic institutions, as well as 
a significant factor in a nation’s 
successful economic development.
Allan Rosenbaum is Professor of Public 
Administration and Director of the 
Institute for Public Management 
and Community Service at Florida 
International University. 
Bibliography
Boex, Jameson and Renata R. Simatupang. “Fiscal 
Decentralisation and Empowerment: Evolving 
Concepts and Alternative Measures.” Fiscal Studies 
29, no. 4 (2008): 435-465.
Cai, H. and D. Treisman. “Did Government 
Decentralization Cause China’s Economic Miracle?” 
World Politics 58, no. 4 (2006): 505-535.
Casper, Gretchen and Michelle M. Taylor. 
Negotiating Democracy: Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1996.
Cheema, G. Shabbir and Dennis A. Rondinelli, 
eds. Decentralization and Development: Policy 
Implementation in Developing Countries. Beverly 
Hills: Sage, 1984.
Cohen, John M. and Stephen B. Peterson. 
Administrative Decentralization Strategies for the 
1990s and Beyond. New York: UN/DDSMS, 1996.
Ellis, Joseph J. Revolutionary Summer The Birth 
of American Independence. New York: Alfred A. 
14844_SIPA_LACC-hemisphere-magazine.indd   14 7/21/15   3:35 PM
Hemisphere Volume 24 15
feature
Knopf, 2013.
Faguet, Jean-Paul. “Does Decentralization 
Increase Government Responsiveness to Local 
Needs? Evidence from Bolivia.” Journal of Public 
Economics 88 (2004): 867-893. 
Hogue, C. Government Organization 
Summary Report: 2012. Retrieved from 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/g12_org.pdf.  
(Sept. 26, 2013).
Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge and Robert M. McNab. 
“Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth.” 
World Development 31, no. 9 (2003): 1597-1616.
McConnell, Grant. Private Power and American 
Democracy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.
Oates, Wallace. Fiscal Federalism. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.
Oi, C. “Fiscal Reform and Economic Foundations 
of Local State Corporatism in China.” World 
Politics 45, no. 1 (1992): 99-126.
Rosales, M. and S. Valencia Carmona. Latin America. 
Retrieved from http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/
gold/Upload/gold_report/06_latinamerica_en.pdf (2006).
Rosenbaum, Allan. “Strengthening Civil Society 
and Local Democracy through National Initiatives: 
The Case of Bolivia’s Popular Participation Law.” 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 
64, no. 1 (1998). 
------. “Decentralization, Local Government 
and Democratic Institution Building.” Journal 
of Regional Studies and Development 18, no. 1 
(2009): 59-81.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract: & 
Discourses. New York: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1920.
Shah, Anwar. Fiscal Decentralization in 
Developing and Transition Economies: Progress, 
Problems and Promise. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank, 2004.
-----, Theresa M. Thompson, and Heng-Fu Zou. 
The Impact of Decentralization on Service Delivery, 
Corruption, Fiscal Management and Growth in 
Developing and Emerging Market Economies: A 
Synthesis of Empirical Evidence. CESifo DICE 
Report, 2004.
Singh, Nirvikar. “Fiscal Decentralization in China 
and India: Competitive, Cooperative or Market 
Preserving Federalism?” Public Finance and 
Management 9, no. 1 (2009): 97-136.
Smith, William C., Carlos H. Acuña, and 
Eduardo Gamarra, eds. Democracy, Markets, and 
Structural Reform in Latin America: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Coral Gables: 
University of Miami North-South Center, 1994.
Thiessen, U. “Fiscal Federalism in Western Europe 
and Selected Other Countries: Centralization or 
Decentralization? What Is Better for Economic 
Growth?” DIW, discussion paper no. 224, 2000.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. New 
York: Harper Perennial, 2000.
United Cities and Local Governments. 
Decentralization and Local Democracy in the 
World. First Global Report. Barcelona: United 
Cities and Local Governments, 2008.
-----. Gold II Local Government Finance: The 
Challenges of the 21st Century. Second Global Report 
on Decentralization and Local Democracy. Barcelona: 
United Cities and Local Governments, 2010.
Urban Institute and Brookings Institution. The Tax 
Policy Briefing Book. The Tax Policy Center, 2014.
Zhang, T. and H. Zou. Fiscal Decentralization, the 
Composition of Public Spending, and Regional Growth 
in India. Washington DC: World Bank, 1997.
It is critical that efforts to build and strengthen local government include major initiatives to encourage the empowerment of all citizens – especially the 
poor and the marginalized. As experience in many highly-developed countries has shown, the failure to undertake such initiatives has significant costs, 
ranging from civil disorder to a decline in confidence in government. In an act of civil disobedience during the Central American Games, civil society 
protests in Plaza Lerdo in Xalapa, Mexico, demanded greater government efforts to end violence in the state. RAUL MENDEZ VELAZQUEZ/Pacific 
Press/LightRocket/Getty Images.
14844_SIPA_LACC-hemisphere-magazine.indd   15 7/21/15   3:35 PM
A Peruvian water distribution worker with a pipe fills a tank with drinking water on the dusty hillside of Pachacútec, a desert suburb, on January 22, 2015 
in Lima Peru. Although Latin America is blessed with an abundance of fresh water, having 20% of global water resources in the Amazon Basin and the 
highest annual rainfall of any region in the world, an estimated 50-70 million Latin Americans (one-tenth of the continent’s population) lack access to safe 
water and 100 million people have no access to any safe sanitation. JAN SOCHOR/LatinContent/Getty Images.
14844_SIPA_LACC-hemisphere-magazine.indd   16 7/21/15   3:35 PM
Hemisphere Volume 24 17
has decentralization Worked?
By Marcelo Giugale
t
hink back to the 
1990s. The Soviet 
union had just 
disintegrated. The 
uS economy was 
on a roll. technology and the 
internet were starting to connect 
people, and democracy was 
spreading fast, especially among 
developing countries that never 
had it before. The newspapers 
were full of reports about new 
presidents and voters speaking 
up freely. Behind the headlines, a 
more subtle political change was 
taking place: power was beginning 
to shift from central governments 
to states and municipalities. Vital 
public services for the common 
citizen – education, health, water, 
electricity and many others – were 
becoming the responsibility of 
governors and mayors. With this 
responsibility came money, some 
in the form of transfers from the 
national budget, some as new local 
taxes, and some from lenders eager 
to gain new clients. This was the 
heyday of “decentralization,” the 
catchy idea that closer proximity 
– literally – between those who 
govern and those who are governed 
is always a good thing. No one can 
know people’s preferences better 
than their local authorities, right? 
and if local leaders fail to deliver, it 
is easier to hold them accountable – 
after all, they are more likely to be 
your neighbors. decentralization, 
or so the thinking went, was sure to 
improve service, reduce corruption 
and save money. 
Several decades later, it is fair to ask: 
has decentralization worked? The 
answer is a bit anticlimactic. When 
it was done well, decentralization 
did work. Success came with smart 
design and careful implementation. 
decentralization was – and still is – a 
high-risk, high-reward reform. a lot 
can go wrong. local bureaucracies 
may not have the capacity to 
manage a school system or a power 
distribution network. They may not 
have the “scale” to keep costs down. 
You can negotiate better prices for, 
say, garbage trucks if you buy them 
by the thousands for a country rather 
than by the dozen for a county. 
Small-town politicians may be 
easier to lobby – or to bribe. labor 
disputes, obsolete equipment and 
irresponsible pension promises are 
just some of the common problems 
plaguing decentralized public services, 
and federal governments are only 
too happy to pass the blame on 
to someone else. left to fend for 
themselves, remote poor areas may 
become even poorer, while big cities 
close to ports grow bigger and richer. 
This is when geography begins to 
matter and regional resentment 
begins to fester. and then there is the 
bailout issue: What should the central 
government do if a local government 
goes bankrupt? can it watch and 
do nothing as a province’s children 
go without school and its hospitals 
go without power? South america 
is living proof that “the federation” 
has no choice but to step in and pay 
up, in effect making everyone in the 
nation pay up, too. 
With so much at stake, it is not 
surprising that few countries can 
claim success in decentralization. 
in fact, there is no evidence that 
when the government is more 
decentralized, the economy grows 
faster or is more stable. Not enough 
data exist to tell one way or the other. 
Nor is it clear that giving more power 
to local governments automatically 
translates into less poverty. 
a growing inventory of 
experiences from around the world 
shows specific public services 
improving – sometimes a lot – when 
local authorities begin to run them. 
for example, giving Swiss cantons 
control over education raised 
student test scores. in canada and 
Spain, infant mortality fell faster 
when provinces were responsible for 
it. Bolivian municipalities managed 
to invest in water and sanitation 
where it was most needed, leading 
to healthier local populations. 
enrollment in ethiopian primary 
schools shot up when woredas 
– a type of territorial division 
somewhere between a neighborhood 
and a municipality – were put in 
charge. The list goes on. it is just as 
easy to make a similar list, however, 
of public services that deteriorated 
when they were decentralized. 
The real question is not whether 
decentralization has worked or not, 
but whether the cases where it has 
succeeded share common factors. 
This seems to be the case. 
C o m m e n t a r y
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first, decentralization makes 
innovation easier. Governors and 
mayors often experiment with 
new ways to deliver old services. 
take the case of schools in Bogotá, 
colombia. in an effort to improve 
its education system, the city 
hired some of the best and most 
exclusive private schools to run 25 
educational centers in low-income 
areas. Students in these “concession 
schools” – where the power of 
teacher unions was limited – did 
much better on standardized tests 
than their peers in the rest of the 
public system. (many actually 
scored higher than their peers in 
the parent private school!) it would 
have been politically and practically 
impossible for the central 
government to try something like 
that on a nationwide scale.
Second, technology helps 
decentralization. in the past two 
decades, computers, cellphones 
and the web have made it easier to 
control and provide public services 
at the local level. municipal officials 
can now be trained online and 
provided with the same information 
as big bureaucracies in the capital. 
They can learn from each other 
with a click of a mouse. New 
gadgets such as transponders, 
remote meters and barcodes have 
made it simpler to charge for 
highways, water and licenses. and 
how about the power of twitter, 
facebook and Youtube to embarrass 
the mayor if he is caught red-handed 
committing an impropriety? or 
the local electricity company if it 
fails to restore power fast enough? 
or the city’s sheriff if he keeps 
pulling over drivers of a certain skin 
color? Neighborhoods have instant 
accountability at their fingertips.
Third, debt has to be kept low. 
over time, local governments 
develop their own sources of income. 
many have received large transfers 
from national sales of oil, gas and 
minerals, making them more 
creditworthy. Bankers have started 
to offer them loans. Governors and 
mayors who avoid, or are not allowed 
to go on, borrowing binges do better 
than those who do. Why? Because 
paying off hefty debts means less 
funding for schools, hospitals and 
roads. The alternative is, of course, 
to beg for money from the federal 
government in exchange for political 
favors – a very messy alternative. Not 
surprisingly, central governments 
have tried to ban or at least control 
“subnational” borrowing, with mixed 
results. (for good ways to regulate 
this, see the example of mexico.) 
one might ask, if decentralization 
needs such careful fine-tuning to 
work well, why do it at all? The 
answer is, because it’s what people 
want. We like to choose our local 
leaders and have a voice in the 
services we use day in and day out. 
There is no going back on that. The 
genie of decentralization is out of 
the bottle already. in the average 
developing country, states and 
municipalities are now in charge of a 
fifth of all public expenditures. The 
proportion is above a third in places 
such as argentina, india, russia and 
South africa. it will continue to 
grow. That’s why, the next time there 
are local elections where you live, be 
sure to vote.
Marcelo Giugale is Senior Director 
of the World Bank’s Global Practice 
for Macroeconomics and Fiscal 
Management and author of 
“Economic Development: What 
Everyone Needs to Know.”
Across the region, new strategic partnerships have been developed to address local challenges creatively and effectively. Country Director of the World Bank 
for Colombia and México, Gloria Grandolini (L), and Colombian singer and songwriter Juanes (R), founder of the Mi Sangre Foundation, attend a 
joint press conference in Bogotá, Colombia, on July 16, 2013, to present their partnership achievements and progress in the field of peace education.  
GUILLERMO LEGARIA/AFP/Getty Images.
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decentralization in Latin america:  
history and future prospects
By Cristina A. Rodríguez-Acosta
Latin america is a diverse continent with more than 570 million inhabitants. it is highly urbanized (77.8% of the population 
lives in cities), with great social and 
economic inequalities. 
This diversity extends to the 
number of municipalities. Some 
countries, such as Brazil, have more 
than 5,000 municipalities, while 
others, such as uruguay, have as 
few as 19. municipal populations 
also vary greatly among countries, 
although nearly 90% of latin 
america’s municipalities have fewer 
than 50,000 inhabitants (rosales 
and Valencia carmona, 2008). 
Similarly, latin american 
countries vary with regard to 
the extent and depth of their 
decentralization processes. over 
the last 30 years all countries 
have initiated or deepened 
political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralization, although in some 
instances, particularly in the case 
of Venezuela, serious regression has 
occurred. 
historically, latin america has 
been a region characterized by 
highly centralized governments. 
only four countries – argentina, 
Brazil, mexico and Venezuela – have 
federal structures. all others are 
organized in a unitary system but 
with different structures of regional 
and local governments and varying 
degrees of decentralization. in all 
countries, the national executive 
branch predominates and politics 
remain highly centralized (rosales, 
2012). 
With the return to democracy 
in many latin american countries 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
emphasis has been on political 
decentralization. in the early 1980s, 
very few countries elected their 
local authorities by popular vote. 
today, mayors are directly and freely 
elected in all countries except cuba, 
where candidates are nominated and 
approved by the cuban communist 
party. administrative and fiscal 
decentralization have followed 
more slowly. 
in general, the larger countries 
of South america - argentina, 
Brazil, Bolivia, chile, colombia 
and ecuador – have initiated 
important reforms and redistributed 
competencies and resources to 
subnational governments, but 
not without many controversies 
and difficulties. mexico initiated 
a policy of “new federalism” and 
opened up its political system, 
but administrative, political and 
fiscal reform has tended to favor 
state governments more than 
local ones. peru saw a slowdown 
of decentralization under former 
president alberto fujimori, but 
the trend has re-emerged in the 
years since 2000. central america 
and the caribbean have moved 
more slowly in this direction, with 
countries such as Guatemala and 
Nicaragua emphasizing political 
decentralization and honduras and 
el Salvador moving incrementally 
toward fiscal decentralization. 
costa rica, one of the most stable 
countries in central america, 
introduced the direct election of 
mayors by popular vote as recently 
as 2002. panama, in contrast, has 
registered very little progress towards 
decentralization (rosales, 2012; 
rosales and Valencia carmona, 
2008). 
in terms of administration, the 
trend has been to decentralize the 
provision of certain services (in 
particular, health and education) 
to subnational governments. The 
extent of these reforms varies greatly, 
as does their financing and the legal 
frameworks that regulate them. 
local governments in latin 
america are usually in charge of 
providing such basic services as 
trash collection, sewer and water 
services, urban planning and 
zoning, parks and recreation, 
market regulation, transit, cultural 
activities, environmental protection 
and public safety. Some countries, 
including Brazil, Bolivia, chile and 
colombia, have gone further and 
transferred additional services such 
as primary health care, elementary 
and secondary education, and other 
social programs to local and regional 
governments (rosales, 2012). in 
argentina and mexico, the three 
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Hundreds of teachers demonstrate along the streets of Guatemala City on January 23, 2014 demanding that the government of Otto Perez Molina 
increase the budget to improve education. JOHAN ORDONEZ/AFP/Getty Images.
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levels of government share delivery 
of social programs, as well as health 
and education, but in central 
america local governments have 
had difficulty providing even basic 
services. fragmentation of policy 
implementation has characterized 
the decentralization process in 
latin america over the last 20 
years, with little synchronization 
between assigning responsibilities, 
tax collection powers, transfers 
from central governments, and 
implementation capacity in many 
countries (lora, 2007). 
fiscal decentralization in latin 
america has also had a mixed 
evolution over the last 30 years 
and has been characterized by great 
asymmetry between devolution 
of expenditure and devolution of 
taxing responsibilities (Brosio, 2012; 
martinez-Vasquez, 2011). 
 Between 1980 and 2009, 
the percentage of subnational 
governments’ expenditures as a 
part of total national expenditures 
increased from 11% to almost 
19%, with countries such as 
colombia and Bolivia (both 
unitary governments) showing 
important increases, from 26% 
to 33% and from 15% to 27%, 
respectively. Since fujimori, peru 
has also increased its subnational 
expenditures from 9% to 34% of 
total government expenditures. 
among federal countries, Brazil 
shows the largest increase, from 
32% to 55%, with argentina and 
mexico recording important gains 
as well. Venezuela experienced 
the smallest increase, from 2.4% 
to just 8%. central american 
countries generally show a decline in 
subnational expenditures as a part of 
total governmental expenditure. The 
exception is el Salvador, which has 
had a very small increase. 
latin american subnational 
governments, and local governments 
in particular, have as their main 
source of revenue locally collected 
taxes and fees (especially property 
taxes); transfers from the central 
government (conditioned or 
unconditional); loans from different 
financial institutions or agencies 
(this option varies greatly by 
country); and other revenue, such as 
royalties, grants, gifts and donations. 
The most common tax that almost 
all countries in latin america assign 
to local governments is the property 
tax, which is by far their largest 
source of local revenue, though the 
ability to collect it varies greatly by 
region and country. other taxes and 
fees include vehicle registrations, 
driver’s licenses, construction permits 
and regulation of public markets. 
one important aspect of 
measuring fiscal decentralization is 
the level of autonomy of subnational 
governments to generate their own 
revenue. in dickovick’s ideal types 
(2011), latin american countries 
range from moderate, with large 
amounts of legally mandated 
transfers and major tax bases but 
inconsistent transfers (Brazil, 
argentina, and colombia), and 
low, with small amounts of legally 
mandated transfers, minor tax 
authority, and minimal transfers 
(most other countries). 
adding to the lack of revenue 
autonomy, many countries still have 
insufficient expenditure autonomy. 
only six countries (argentina, Brazil, 
ecuador, el Salvador, uruguay and 
Venezuela) allow local governments 
to create new taxes, and in seven 
others (Bolivia, costa rica, mexico, 
Nicaragua, panama, paraguay and 
uruguay) the regional or central 
government has veto power over 
local governments’ budgets. many 
countries suffer from a lack of local 
administrative capacity, as well as 
too much fragmentation (local 
governments that are too small), a 
lack of clear legal frameworks for 
assigning expenditure responsibilities, 
confusion over revenue sharing 
(formulas are not clear, leading to 
extended debates and discussions 
over the conditionality or not of 
revenue sharing), irresponsible 
borrowing, and overreliance 
on transfers from the central 
government. 
Because latin american 
subnational governments have come 
to rely heavily on transfers from the 
central government, their own tax 
resources have remained stagnant 
(Gomez Sabaini and Jimenez, 
2012). This overreliance on transfers 
exposes subnational governments 
to budget cuts stemming from 
macroeconomic fiscal and 
economic imbalances, as occurred 
during the 2008 economic crisis, 
for example. it also makes them 
vulnerable to conditions imposed 
by central governments (rezende 
and Veloso, 2012) and to shifting 
political alliances.  
Some of the main flaws identified 
by rezende and Veloso (2012) in the 
intergovernmental transfer system 
in latin america include the lack 
of clear principles and objectives 
for organizing such transfers, the 
multiplicity of transfer sources 
and criteria, rules that are neither 
clear nor stable, new and multiple 
conditions on the use of such 
funds, and the absence of periodical 
review of the transfer regime. This 
overreliance creates a disincentive for 
subnational governments to improve 
their own revenue collection capacity 
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(martinez-Vasquez, 2011), reducing 
their negotiation ability vis-à-vis the 
central government. Some of these 
weaknesses need to be addressed if 
subnational governments in latin 
america are to achieve expenditure 
and revenue autonomy, both key 
factors in the delivery of public 
services. 
some final perspectives on 
decentralization in Latin america 
after more than 30 years of 
political, fiscal, and administrative 
decentralization, results in the 
hemisphere are mixed, difficulties 
and challenges are many, and, in 
some instances, a sense exists that 
decentralization is no longer a 
priority. it could be that the region’s 
tradition of strong executive 
leadership and its resulting 
tendency toward centralization is 
too strong and difficult to overcome 
(restrepo, 2006). 
decentralization is by no means 
the perfect answer to a country’s 
development. it does not ensure 
better service delivery, and it is not 
the only factor influencing citizen 
participation. Weak administrative 
or technical capacity at the local 
level can hinder the process, and 
the resulting inefficiencies can entail 
the loss of economies of scale. local 
elite capture of service delivery can 
also be a serious problem, increasing 
or creating tensions between local 
and regional governments and 
central governments over control 
of scarce financial resources (World 
Bank report, 2007; rondinelli, et 
al 1984).
Nevertheless, some achievements 
are associated with decentralization 
in latin america. These include 
popular election of sub-regional and 
local authorities. further, the legal 
framework for decentralization has 
brought important political reforms 
and increased citizen participation 
in most countries. Subnational 
governments have increased their 
share of expenditures and revenues 
and have more decision-making 
authority as to how those funds can 
be spent. The transfer to subnational 
 Brazil (1980) 32.4 Brazil (2008) 55.0
 Argentina (1980) 22.2 Argentina (2006) 50.8
 Mexico (1980) 22.0 Mexico (2007) 31.8
 Venezuela (1979) 2.4 Venezuela (2007) 8.0
   
 Colombia (1982) 26.3 Colombia (2006) 33.0
 Ecuador (1980) 18.3 Ecuador (2004) 22.1
 Bolivia 1986 14.8 Bolivia (2008) 27.0
 Peru (1990) 9.1 Peru (2007) 34.0
 Uruguay (1980) 8.6 Uruguay (2005) 13.2
 El Salvador (1978) 5.8 El Salvador (2007) 7.0
 Paraguay (1980) 5.5 Paraguay (2007) 6.5
 Guatemala (1980) 4.5 Guatemala (2009) 4.4
 Costa Rica (1980) 4.0 Costa Rica (2007) 3.7
 Chile (1980) 3.7 Chile (2007) 14.0
 Dominican Rep. (1980) 3.5 Dominican Rep. (2006) 5.3
 Panama (1980) 2.0 Panama (2005) 1.7
 Average Latin America 11.6 Average Latin America  18.9
Source: Adapted from Rosales (2012, page 25), based on IMF, World Bank, IDB, and UCLG data.
Percentage of Total Governmental Expenditures by Subnational Governments
1980 to 2009
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governments of policy-making 
decisions and implementation has 
contributed considerably to increased 
capacity at the local level. citizen 
participation has led to innovations 
in social policy implementation, as 
well as the inclusion of previously 
excluded social groups in the 
policymaking process. municipal 
associations in particular have been 
strengthened, and overall subnational 
levels of government have taken a 
more proactive role (rosales, 2012). 
Their increased relevance is reflected 
in the number of subnational 
authorities going on to become 
national leaders in their countries.
Cristina A. Rodríguez-Acosta is 
Deputy Director of the Institute for 
Public Management and Community 
Service at Florida International 
University and a PhD candidate in 
Public Administration.
references
Brosio, Giorgio and Juan Pablo Jimenez (eds). 
Decentralization and Reform in Latin America: 
Improving Intergovernmental Relations. United 
Nations, 2012. 
Gomez Sabaini, Juan Carlos and Juan Pablo 
Jimenez. “The Financing of Subnational 
Governments.” In Decentralization and Reform 
in Latin America: Improving Intergovernmental 
Relations. United Nations, 2012. 
Lora, Eduardo (ed). The State of State Reform in 
Latin America. The Inter-American Development 
Bank. Stanford University Press. 2007.
Martínez-Vázquez, Jorge. América Latina en 
la financiación de los gobiernos locales: desafíos 
del siglo XXI. Segundo informe mundial sobre la 
descentralización y la democracia local. United 
Cities and Local Governments (UCGL). Gold II. 
Thomson Reuters, 2011.
Restrepo, Darío I. (ed.). Historias de 
descentralización: transformación del régimen 
político y cambio en el modelo de desarrollo 
América Latina, Europa y EUA. Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia. Bogotá, November 2006.
Rezende, Fernando and Joao Veloso. 
“Intergovernmental Transfers in Subnational 
Finances.” In Decentralization and Reform in 
Latin America: Improving Intergovernmental 
Relations. United Nations, 2012.
Rondinelli, Dennis A, John R. Nellis and G. 
Shabbir Cheema. “Decentralization in Developing 
Countries. A Review of Recent Experience.” The 
World Bank Staff Working Paper. No. 581. 
Management and Development Series, no. 8. The 
World Bank, 1984.
Rosales, Mario and Salvador Valencia Carmona. 
Latin America chapter in Decentralization and 
Local Democracy in the World. First Global 
Report by United Cities and Local Governments. 
Co-publication of The World Bank and the UCLG. 
2008.
Rosales, Mario. Descentralización del estado y 
finanzas municipales en América Latina. Síntesis 
actualizada de los informes regionales sobre 
descentralización en América Latina de CGLU 
y FLACMA. Venezuela: Editorial Universidad 
Bolivariana, 2012.
Brazilian Minister of Planning Miriam Belchior talking during a press conference in Brasilia on August 29, 2013 about the increase in the 2014 
budget. EVARISTO SA/AFP/Getty Images.
14844_SIPA_LACC-hemisphere-magazine.indd   23 7/21/15   3:35 PM
24 Hemisphere Volume 24
Commentary
i
t is a well-known fact that 
the two major contributions 
of the eighteenth-century 
revolutions that led to the 
organization of the modern 
state are, first, the division of power, 
facilitated by the french revolution; 
and second, the decentralized 
system of power introduced by the 
american revolution. Both of these 
revolutions adopted state structures 
according to an existing political 
praxis of social organization. 
france, with a long tradition 
of absolutism and centralization, 
used the division of powers as a 
method to disperse authority. a 
decentralized system in france, 
had it been implemented at that 
time with the imposition of the 
new democratic system, risked the 
breakout of lawlessness, precisely 
because of the absence of a tradition 
of local governance.  
The history of the united States 
reflects the other side of this argument: 
With its long tradition of local 
development, including a citizenry 
not only aware of its rights but also of 
its duties and obligations to society, 
the young nation would have found it 
difficult, if not impossible, to install a 
centralized system. This political reality 
required the establishment of a federal 
decentralized state, achieved via the 
alignment and consolidation of the 
states associated under the articles of 
confederation.  
The french and uS cases highlight 
the fact that political systems are not 
born by spontaneous generation, 
but come about as the result of long 
historical processes that reflect cultural 
symbols and a vision of the past. The 
great leaps of social change that occur 
during a revolution also arise within a 
set of complex processes. a revolution 
is, in fact, a special situation that 
exacerbates the fundamental political 
and civil society relationship along key 
elements. The new state arising from 
this process will reflect the outcomes 
and trade-offs between the defining 
characteristics of various interests or 
social sectors.
in this manner, the overthrow 
of military dictatorship in South 
america led to the emergence of 
new democratic processes. most 
countries proclaimed new national 
constitutions and approved 
decentralized systems to secure 
newly won freedoms and return to 
citizens the power to decide their 
own destinies, and, in so doing, 
bring the state closer to the citizens. 
These new governments worked to 
enable people, either as individuals 
or as a community, to participate in 
the management of public affairs, a 
right denied to them under previous 
dictatorships.
Nonetheless, even while South 
americans were demanding their 
rights and instituting measures to 
limit the powers of political leaders, 
there was still no consensus on the 
best way to create institutions to 
limit those powers and allow greater 
citizen control. many proponents 
cited decentralization as a great way 
to disperse state power, but it is 
unclear how deeply they understood 
the details and implications of 
such a system, or whether it was 
a bottom-up approach to politics. 
argentina, Brazil and mexico, for 
example, adopted federal systems 
in the nineteenth century but never 
reached the level of decentralization 
of the united States, nor did their 
local governments gain sufficient 
power and resources to manage 
their own territories. today, after 
more than a quarter of a century of 
decentralization in latin america, 
the results of this process vary among 
countries. Some decentralized nations 
are more successful than others, 
and some have begun to reverse the 
process and consolidate power in the 
central government.
how can we explain the sluggish 
adoption of decentralization policy 
in the region? in principle, it should 
be the best policy for countries 
with absentee governments and 
countless forgotten regions. one 
possible explanation is a lack of social 
eagerness to take advantage of the new 
possibilities offered by a decentralized 
system. The conservative opposition 
exploits this weakness to block the 
legislative and financial policies 
that would allow for the complete 
implementation of a comprehensive 
decentralization policy. 
Basic Conditions for decentralization and 
state reorganization in Latin america
By Víctor-Jacinto Flecha
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Several basic conditions must 
be met prior to the initiation of 
the decentralization process. The 
average citizen needs to have a clear 
understanding of what decentralized 
power means, the political class 
has to have a real desire to pursue 
decentralization, and strong and 
able institutions must exist at the 
local level of government. another 
key factor is a society in which 
individuals are capable of assuming 
their role as citizens. Without these 
conditions, which must progress in 
unison, the decentralization process 
will be only symbolic.
to help meet the above conditions, 
the international organizations that 
support democratization in latin 
america should take into account 
the differences between countries 
in the region and their historical 
experiences. projects and strategies 
cannot be transferred from one 
country to another without passing 
through cultural filters. They must 
address the various issues that make 
for an empowered local government, 
including leveraging the local cultural 
elements that strengthen citizen 
participation and control without 
overlooking crucial capacity building 
and training of municipal officials.
Víctor-Jacinto Flecha is President of 
the Paraguayan NGO COPLANEA, 
which is dedicated to strengthening 
local governments in Paraguay.  He 
is a sociologist and political scientist, 
professor and political analyst, and 
author of numerous books and articles. 
In December 2014, he received the 
Diploma of Civil Heroes of Paraguay, 
awarded by the International Center 
for the Promotion of Human Rights 
under the auspices of UNESCO for 
unwavering struggle for democratic 
values and human rights.  
Amazonian indigenous activists march from Trinidad, Beni department in northeastern 
Bolivia toward La Paz, June 21, 2010, to ask President Evo Morales to assign budgets to their 
autonomous governments. CARLOS VARGAS/AFP/Getty Images.
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mexican decentralization in the  
Context of an evolving nation
By Ilyana Albarrán
d
ecades of 
decentralization 
efforts have, 
without doubt, 
brought changes to 
the mexican federal system. The 
democratization process of the 
1980s resulted in a shift of power 
to the local level and an insistence 
on reform. This resulted in the 
decentralization of decision-making 
authority to local governments, 
with legislation that allowed for a 
more transparent, formula-driven 
distribution of fiscal transfers. 
political pluralism began in 1988, 
with opposition parties progressively 
winning state elections and reducing 
the power of the hegemonic party. 
for 70 years (1929-2000), a 
single political party, the partido 
revolucionario institucional (pri), 
had effectively concentrated power 
in the executive branch. political 
pluralism was promptly followed by 
electoral reforms, with the period of 
democratic transition culminating in 
2000, when majority control of the 
national government shifted from 
the pri to the partido de acción 
Nacional (paN). 
during the 1980s-90s transition, 
constitutional amendments limited 
state authority and redefined 
municipal responsibilities. 
municipalities benefited from the 
strengthening of their powers and 
resources through reform of article 
115 of the constitution in 1983 
and 1999. These modifications 
decentralized responsibility for 
the management of basic services 
to the municipal levels, giving 
municipalities the right to collect 
property taxes from private 
industries. in addition, new fiscal 
formulas distributed federal funds 
more transparently and reliably. 
reforms allowed municipalities to 
organize their public administrations 
and regulate their service delivery. 
municipal fiscal and regulatory 
responsibilities and power increased 
significantly; no longer mere 
administrative bodies controlled 
by a national government run by 
a single political party, municipal 
councils ceased their dependence on 
the resources and decisions of the 
presidency of the republic. 
following fiscal decentralization, 
efforts grew to increase citizen 
participation in the allocation of 
resources at the local level, with the 
aim of bringing government closer 
to the people. poverty alleviation 
programs were designed to allow 
communities to manage projects 
within their communities, with the 
goal of creating more accountability 
for federal funds and locally raised 
revenue destined for public works 
and social programs. municipal 
governments are currently the 
principal institutional players in 
the operation of public policy at 
the local level, including urban 
development and planning, local 
On December 2, 2012 in Mexico City, President Enrique Pena Nieto and the main three political 
parties of Mexico signed an agreement to launch reforms to strengthen democracy, fight social 
inequality and promote economic growth. ALFREDO ESTRELLA/AFP/Getty Images.
s p e C I a L  f o C u s :  m e X I C o
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transportation, building permits, 
public services, municipal public 
security and, to varying degrees, 
health and education policy.
The focus on decentralization 
has brought an enormous increase 
in the role of local government in 
shaping the nation’s future. At the 
same time, however, frustration with 
the country’s systemic inequality 
and corruption, especially the 
collusion between law enforcement 
and drug trafficking interests, have 
called into question the ability of 
decentralization efforts alone to 
bring about a less corrupt and more 
accountable government. 
Mexico, despite being the world’s 
fourteenth largest economy, continues 
to be plagued by high levels of 
inequality. The country’s Gini 
index score — a measure of income 
inequality — places Mexico at a 
comparable level with much poorer 
countries, including Paraguay and 
Bolivia. Moreover, in 2014, Mexico 
scored a dismal 35 on Transparency 
International’s index of perceived 
public sector corruption, on a scale 
ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 
100 (no corruption). Drug traffickers 
routinely infiltrate and control police 
and prosecutors at the municipal, state 
and federal levels. Atrocities such as 
the police abduction and massacre of 
43 students in Guerrero in September 
2014, at the direct order of municipal 
authorities, paint a grim picture of 
some of the newly empowered local 
authorities and their ability to govern. 
Since the massacre, 19 more mass 
graves have been found in the area 
and 26,000 people remain missing. 
Overall, the drug war has claimed 
more than 100,000 lives across the 
country since 2006. 
Attempts to strengthen Mexico’s 
municipalities have come at the cost 
of weakening the national state. As 
the Mexican federal government 
lost its power to take action as a 
single body, lower-level governments 
became more autonomous and able 
to act independently in discordance 
with the central government. 
Criminal organizations, able to 
seek protection from conflicting 
government powers, have 
increased their propensity for 
violent confrontation, effectively 
creating their own private armies. 
Following the student massacre in 
Guerrero, for example, the federal 
government took 10 days to open 
an investigation of the crime, and 
the army – even with a military 
base close to the incident - was 
unable to stop the kidnapping or the 
incineration of the student’s bodies. 
State oversight is a requirement 
for establishing accountability, and 
different levels of government need 
to coordinate security operations. 
Local governments must serve 
the needs of their constituents 
while coordinating with state and 
federal agencies to create unified 
leadership for the future. Mexico’s 
democratic transition and its 
concurrent political decentralization 
have fallen short of empowering 
society at the local level; instead, 
the transition has only diversified 
power bases for members of 
the business and political class. 
In recent polls, confidence in 
government institutions, such as 
the police, military and politicians 
at all levels, has fallen drastically. 
The resulting lack of government 
legitimacy has led to apathy, less 
voting, and less participation at the 
local level, putting democracy at 
risk. To address this threat, Mexico 
is in need of structural overhaul 
and civil service reforms to target 
impunity and corruption within 
municipalities and all levels of 
government to restore confidence 
in bureaucratic and political 
institutions. 
Ilyana Albarrán is a PhD Candidate 
in Public Administration at Florida 
International University.
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c
apital markets in the 
developing world 
have grown in recent 
years. This is nowhere 
more prevalent than in 
mexico, which now has four options 
for state and local governments to 
obtain loans. public officials may 
select from development bank loans, 
commercial banks, trust funds, or 
bonds tradable on the mexican 
security market. With the plethora 
of options, mexican subnational 
governments are taking out more 
loans for productive measures to 
encourage economic development. 
many state governments have 
substantial debt loads, but municipal 
public officials are only now seeing 
the influence of these loans on their 
local economies. The news media 
have warned of the potential problem: 
“fiscal hole. State public finances 
faced a difficult fourth quarter of 
2014 due to an accumulated gap 
of $1.1 billion pesos missing from 
federal contributions,” reported mario 
Verdusco in a february 3, 2015 article 
in el universal, a mexican daily. also 
in el universal, José manuel arteaga 
reported on august 13, 2009: “State 
and local authorities are hedging and 
issuing debt in order to deal with the 
financial crisis.” 
The global financial crisis of 
2007-09 had strong repercussions 
in mexico, and the recent decrease 
in the price of oil has raised fears 
of financial trouble in the near 
future. mexico’s closeness to the 
uS economy, especially because of 
its free trade relationship through 
Nafta, has created inevitable 
economic slowdowns. in an 
effort to reduce the effects of the 
financial crisis, then president 
felipe calderon allocated the 
largest obligation in history, more 
than 1.8 billion pesos (around 
uS$120 million) to the national 
development bank (Banco Nacional 
de obras y Servicios públicos, 
or Banobras) to finance small, 
economically feasible projects at the 
state and local government levels, 
but low oil prices have slowed 
economic growth. 
The administrative structure of 
municipal debt in mexico
Since the 1997 reform of article 
9 of the fiscal coordination law 
(ley de coordinación fiscal, or 
lcf), which gave municipalities 
the right to take out commercial 
bank loans, mexico has seen a new 
emphasis on public debt. part of 
the decentralization efforts of the 
1990s, the lcf aimed to centralize 
tax collection efforts at the state 
government level so the federal 
government could redistribute the 
national budget fairly and equitably 
across mexico’s 2,400 municipalities, 
32 states and capital district. mexican 
states collect tax and leasing fees, 
and municipalities have the right to 
collect small fees and other minor 
taxes. The lcf created a system of 
federal transfers, earmarking 85% 
of state revenues for social programs 
and another 7% for non-earmarked 
discretionary funds. But the new 
tax system created large fiscal holes 
in local government accounts, and 
without appropriate incentives 
and policies to encourage local 
governments to collect taxes, fiscal 
federalism has failed to live up to 
expectations. many state and local 
governments have turned to the 
municipal bond market to leverage 
additional revenues to finance 
public projects and infrastructure 
development.
along with fiscal decentralization, 
the political environment has opened 
up to vastly greater competition. in 
1997, the institutional revolutionary 
party (pri) lost its majority control 
in the national congress after nearly 
a century of hegemony. it lost the 
presidency as well to the right-
leaning National action party (paN) 
in 2000. The pri reclaimed the 
presidency in 2012, but by then 
mexican politics had become more 
competitive than ever before. in this 
new climate of political competition, 
municipal governments have had 
more opportunities to increase 
their debt usage, especially during 
election years (ibarra, 2009; Benton 
and Smith, 2013), when, some 
analysts have argued, both state 
and local governments use debt for 
political promises.
managing subnational debt in times 
of Crisis: Lessons from mexico
By Heidi Jane Smith
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mexico’s subnational debt 
framework is a hybrid between 
rules-based and market-based 
approaches (canuto and liu, 2010). 
Specifically, current legislation 
encourages local governments to 
seek out private rating agencies to 
appraise their budgets, although 
not all municipal governments have 
a rating or can afford to hire an 
agency. With positive evaluations of 
their financial systems, operational 
activities, economic profiles and 
performance, local governments 
can find better terms and sources 
for their public sector loans. The 
mexican ministry of finance 
requires state and local governments 
to report long-term debt loads 
directly to the federal government, 
which provides oversight of 
subnational capital markets by 
monitoring the total loan amounts. 
States typically set debt ceilings; for 
example, as a percentage of Gdp, 
a ratio of debt to state income, or 
a set total. This is an effort to limit 
municipal borrowing capacity, 
which has the potential to spin out 
of control. 
Increased consumption  
of municipal debt 
total subnational debt in mexico 
grew from 990 pesos per capita in 
2001 to 3,450 pesos per capita in 
2011 (Benton and Smith, 2013). 
Yet, mexico has a very low debt-
to-Gdp ratio: slightly more than 
40%, with the state and municipal 
portion hovering around 2.5% 
(imf, 2012). for comparison, 
debt levels in chile in 2009 were 
around 13% of Gdp, while in Brazil 
they were around 48% (carranza, 
daude and melguizo, 2011). The 
pace of subnational government 
debt accelerated during the 2009 
economic crisis, when national 
Gdp decreased substantially (by 
around 6.5%). The last quarter of 
2014 was difficult for the public 
finances of mexican states, which 
accumulated a gap of 1.1 billion 
pesos (approximately uS$77 million) 
due to lower federal contributions. 
The fiscal gap reported by all states 
during that period is partially 
explained by the decrease in national 
accounts from the collecting of oil 
rents (Verdusco, 2015). 
all forms of subnational debt in 
mexico that are subject to sovereign 
risk are guaranteed by the national 
government (including some 
corporate loans, financing for state-
owned enterprises, municipal and 
state bonds, and credit for public 
private partnerships), the assumption 
being that the government of a 
sovereign nation will honor its debt 
obligations. mexico’s sovereign rating 
is very high for latin america, and it 
was only the second country in the 
region after chile to earn a coveted 
Although Mexico’s overall subnational debt is still relatively small compared to other forms of credit available in the country, current budget constraints at the 
local level could fuel excessive funding trends in the absence of national legislation governing the rights and responsibilities of subnational governments.
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Mexico’s Ministry of Finance may need to review, publicize and improve bankruptcy laws to cope with moral hazard issues. In the United States, for 
example, Chapter 9 bankruptcy clauses have helped avoid numerous federal bailouts in recent history. These laws assist in deterring politicians and public 
budgeting professionals from taking out too much debt and create alternative clauses, such as Chapter 11, to identify ways to renegotiate debt packages.
“a” grade from moody’s. The recent 
upgrade to a3 from Baa1 was the 
result of economic reforms president 
enrique peña Nieto pushed through 
congress during the last part of 2013 
(Sarmiento, 2015). mexico’s peso 
and leading share index both turned 
positive after the upgrade, which 
should help lower the country’s 
national borrowing costs. 
although mexico’s overall 
subnational debt is still relatively 
small compared to other forms 
of credit available in the country, 
current budget constraints at the 
local level could fuel excessive 
funding trends in the absence 
of national legislation governing 
the rights and responsibilities of 
subnational governments. proposals 
for such legislation include: 1) 
harmonizing state and local 
government accounting standards; 
2) increasing transparency and 
improving reporting requirements; 3) 
expanding fiscal policy by reviewing 
policies for managing debt sources; 
and 4) improving bankruptcy laws to 
cope with moral hazard issues. 
how to manage the common 
pool resource
mexico has learned many lessons 
from developed countries on how to 
limit state and local borrowing while 
allowing the local debt market to 
work with little national government 
control (laubach, 2005; Kincaid, 
2012). historically, voters have acted 
as a political constraint on curbing 
the common pool resource problem 
of overreaching municipal debt 
in the united States. Von hagen 
(1991) explained that the principal-
agent aspect of the voter-politician 
relationship helps the electorate 
constrain politicians from taking out 
too much debt. Yet, he found that 
politicians are likely to find ways to 
circumvent the rules as necessary 
for self-interest. for example, a 
governor’s veto power can serve to 
eliminate or change rules regarding 
incurring debt (Von hagen, 1991).
Subnational governments, 
including states, cantons and 
provincial governments, should have 
the authority to create balanced 
budget rules, whether statutory or 
constitutional; establish tax and 
expenditure limitations, if they 
so choose; or create some sort of 
local bankruptcy or fiscal distress 
provisions in their state constitutions 
(Spiotto, acker and appleby, 2012). 
State variations reflect local policy 
preferences and fiscal decisions 
at the local level. rodden (2006) 
suggests fiscal discipline can only 
be created to constrain subnational 
credit markets when there is a strong 
national government. ultimately, 
the most important element of 
fiscal rules is how to control public 
managers from over-consuming 
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the common pool at all levels of 
government. mexico reformed its 
accounting codes in 2012, and the 
National auditors association is 
implementing the new rules.
State governments can set balanced 
budget requirements, tax and 
expenditure restrictions, and debt 
limitation schemes. mexican states 
have improved their transparency 
laws and reporting requirements by 
creating fiscal rules and reporting all 
long-term debt to the undersecretary 
for debt. State governments have 
also expanded their fiscal policy 
by publicizing their debt packages. 
This includes announcing sources of 
public debt (from commercial banks, 
Banobras, trust funds or bonds) 
and identifying how each loan will 
be paid off, either from budget 
expenditures or user fees. local 
governments can identify better 
rates for their debt loads and find 
the best terms for their public sector 
loans. ascertaining local own source 
income, such as user fees and service 
fees to be paid directly to their loans, 
also decreases costs. cost benefit 
analysis or feasibility studies can be 
used to identify if a project is viable 
and requires long-term finances.
finally, the ministry of finance 
may need to review, publicize 
and improve bankruptcy laws to 
cope with moral hazard issues. 
The literature questions whether 
sanctioning public officials, either 
with punitive charges or financial 
ones, will deter violators (Spiotto, 
acker and appleby, 2012). Some 
academics argue that over-scrutiny 
of small amounts of corruption 
is no deterrent for public officials 
(levitin, 2012), especially when 
large-scale corruption is often not 
exposed. in the united States, for 
example, chapter 9 bankruptcy 
clauses have helped avoid numerous 
federal bailouts in recent history 
(Kelemen and teo, 2014). These 
laws assist in deterring politicians 
and public budgeting professionals 
from taking out too much debt 
and create alternative clauses, such 
as chapter 11, to identify ways to 
renegotiate debt packages. clear 
rules, strong public management 
principles, and improved financial 
systems and planning will ensure 
sustainable subnational public 
finances in the future.
Heidi Jane Smith received her PhD 
from Florida International University 
and is currently an adjunct professor 
at George Mason University. She 
served as a visiting scholar at the 
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de 
México (ITAM).
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t
his article explores 
some aspects of 
intergovernmental 
relations with the aim 
of identifying key 
elements to help advance a better 
understanding of decentralization in 
colombia. We begin by analyzing 
two decades of decentralization in 
colombia, going on to propose some 
central questions and identifying key 
challenges and recommendations.
history of intergovernmental 
relations in Colombia
in 1991, colombia passed a new 
constitution in response to strong 
citizen activism, particularly from 
college students, demanding a new 
set of institutional arrangements 
for a state that was falling apart 
under the manifold pressures of 
drug lords, guerrillas, urban crime 
and paramilitary factions. This 
constitution made colombia a 
unitary decentralized state.
despite some steps toward 
decentralization before this point, 
including the adoption of the 
popular vote to elect municipal 
mayors and department (provincial) 
governors, the 1991 constitution 
was the key to adapting the nation’s 
political and administrative structure 
to a less centralized model. The new 
constitution was also an opportunity 
to respond to the persistent demands 
of regional politicians and key local 
actors for greater autonomy.
The new institutional arrangements 
allowed departments and 
municipalities to implement social 
policy directly, specifically health 
and education policy. This decision 
considerably increased transfers 
from the central government to 
municipalities and departments, but 
above all, it increased the amount 
of resources directly managed 
by subnational units. colombia 
ranks high among latin american 
countries in terms of such transfers 
(See figure 1), but demand for 
greater decentralized autonomy 
remains high. 
in spite of continuous efforts 
to improve provincial autonomy, 
colombia’s subnational 
governments still show divergent 
levels of institutional capacity. as 
figure two shows, subnational 
governments’ dependence on the 
central government has remained 
almost unchanged during the last 
decade. The levels of fiscal effort of 
decentralization and Intergovernmental 
relations in Colombia: 
Issues for a state still searching for structure and Capacity
By Pablo Sanabria
Figure 1
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municipalities and departments still 
appear low in the latin american 
context, although they have increased 
over the last two decades. 
even more, the relevant data shows 
an enormous degree of disparity 
in institutional capacity among 
subnational units (i.e. antioquia 
or Valle del cauca compared to 
neighboring chocó). although 
some regions exhibit greater ability 
to implement policies and generate 
fiscal resources, most of the country´s 
municipalities and departments still 
rely heavily on central government 
transfers and technical assistance. 
exploring and explaining the 
challenges of decentralization in 
Colombia 
Since 1991, a number of social 
actors have shown greater interest 
in effectively implementing 
decentralization efforts. That goal 
remains distant. Three important 
elements explain some of the 
difficulties that colombia has faced 
in this process: 1) a de jure vs. de 
facto gap in decentralization; 2) 
an existing dichotomy between 
providing autonomy and ensuring 
institutional capacity; and 3) a high 
level of divergence in public policy 
that tends to deepen dependence on 
the central government. 
colombia epitomizes the tendency 
of developing countries to issue 
norms in response to administrative 
problems with very low 
enforcement capacity. The country’s 
decentralization strategy relies on 
normative efforts that look like a 
Best Practices Panel at Florida International University’s XX Inter-American Conference of Mayors: “Building Sustainable, Equitable and Smart 
Cities: New Challenges for Latin America,” held in Miami June 9-12, 2014. From left to right: Hon. James Cañas Rendón, Mayor, Municipality of 
Montenegro, Colombia; Dr. Allan Rosenbaum, Director, Institute for Public Management and Community Service, Florida International University; 
Hon. Angel Erreyes, Mayor, Municipality of Yantzaza, Ecuador; Mr. Lenin Villeda Carvajal, Manager, Mancomunidad of Guisayote, Honduras; and 
Mr. Gustavo Espinoza Gómez, Administrative and Financial Manager, Municipality of La Molina, Peru. FELIPE SOTO.
Figure 2
Transfers from Central Government to Municipalities and 
Departments (Provinces), Colombia 2000 – 2014
Source: Ministry of Finance, Colombia
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good idea on paper but in practice 
are not implemented, given the lack 
of state capacity. decentralization in 
colombia embodies important legal 
advancements, but in terms of actual 
implementation a number of goals 
remain to be achieved, including 
local fiscal responsibility and 
autonomy, improved institutional 
capacity, etc. The point is, while a 
law can distribute and decentralize 
power, it cannot always distribute 
institutional capacity, which 
varies widely between subnational 
governments. 
colombia has aimed to improve 
the autonomy of municipalities and 
departments. The catch is ensuring 
that each area has the institutional 
capacity to take advantage of this 
increased autonomy. The actual 
autonomy of the subnational units 
to administer resources from central 
government transfers is restricted, 
since the central government 
predefines the use of such resources. 
additionally, while the bigger 
municipalities have greater leeway 
to manage their own resources, 
many smaller and medium sized 
municipalities still depend on the 
provincial level, creating a new locus 
of conflict between departments and 
municipalities. 
The decentralized unitary model 
of 1991 continues to evolve while 
adjusting to the realities and 
capacities of both the national 
and subnational governments. 
in principle, a model based on 
autonomy should reveal differences 
in orientation and shape between 
national and subnational policies, 
while maintaining the overall criteria 
for defining action frameworks and 
policy instruments. in practice, 
however, what has emerged is a 
high level of technical dependence 
on the national government, 
particularly in policy formulation. 
The central government remains 
the main provider of policy, given 
that many subnational units lack 
the institutional capacity to fully 
implement this legislation.
decentralization  
agenda for Colombia
These challenges demand a better 
understanding of the context of 
intergovernmental relations in 
colombia to reduce the gaps between 
de jure and de facto decentralization 
and the divergence between the 
different layers of governance. The 
following recommendations, though 
not exhaustive, aim to open avenues 
for rethinking the formulation and 
workings of intergovernmental 
relations in colombia. They can 
be understood as both a research 
agenda and also as a policy agenda 
for the government to enhance the 
decentralization process. 
1. What is the optimal level of 
vertical cooperation between 
national and subnational 
governments? research should 
work to identify the actual 
modes by which the center and 
the territories relate to each 
other, especially the formal, 
and more important, informal 
mechanisms whereby the center 
and the regions work together 
and separately. The state should 
develop empirical studies to 
disentangle the various effects of 
the colombian decentralization 
process in public policy 
(formulation, implementation, 
etc.) and generate evidence 
for the benefits of an 
intergovernmental collaborative 
model beyond the usual 
federalism/centralism clichés. 
2. Just as important as the 
relationship between the 
center and the territories, an 
understanding is also critical 
of the controversial and 
divergent relationship between 
the provincial level and the 
municipalities. Studies should 
identify the new forms of 
horizontal collaboration that 
have appeared in response to 
decentralization efforts or suggest 
a new set of intergovernmental 
communication mechanisms 
for those units with low 
institutional capacity. horizontal 
intergovernmental relations must 
become more diversified, along 
with mechanisms to address 
problems that exist outside of 
the traditional administrative 
boundaries between (and within) 
departments and municipalities. 
3. The field should also pursue a 
regionally based and contextually 
driven definition of institutional 
capacity versus the traditional 
central government definition. 
research needs to expand the 
definition of what it means to 
be capable in regional terms. 
territories, departments and 
municipalities are inherently 
different; in a country like 
colombia, these institutions 
are affected in different ways, 
and in varying magnitudes, by 
innumerable phenomena (i.e., 
conflict, poverty, inequality, etc.). 
forcing these diverse units into 
a single measurement of their 
ability is unfair and unhelpful. 
researchers should consult with 
departments and municipalities 
about their goals, expectations 
and abilities to define a more 
comprehensive concept of 
institutional capacity in its 
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various dimensions. a regionally 
articulated construction of 
development plans could help to 
initiate these shifts.
4. The deployment of regionally 
based information systems is key 
to a better understanding of the 
policy process at the subnational 
level. The central government 
can help generate better policies 
at the municipal and provincial 
levels by releasing reliable and 
systematic information on 
key topics such as budget and 
financial administration, local 
management, policy formulation 
and implementation. a 
dependable regional information 
system would facilitate multilevel 
governance by enabling 
the central government to 
develop an informed view of 
developments in the territories. 
in turn, this information could 
help subnational governments 
better use evidence and 
implement best practices in 
decision-making and policy. 
The role of the National 
planning department is crucial 
in developing such a system.
5. Generating public management 
skills at the subnational 
level involves more than the 
implementation of centrally 
issued protocols, paperwork 
and checkpoints. Subnational 
units need support to develop 
public management capacity and 
specific competencies at the local 
level. a new strategy could take a 
different approach to the current 
organizational structure at the 
national level and reconsider how 
central government offices and 
officials are dispersed across the 
territory. This type of capacity 
development strategy should 
also include a formal plan of 
action with contingent technical 
assistance for the development 
of hard management skills at 
the local level (e.g. budgeting, 
human talent, organizational 
development) as well as 
cognitive skills (e.g. leadership, 
effective communication, 
teamwork, ethics). universities 
have an important role to play 
as repositories of knowledge 
and sources of creativity, 
development and innovation.
6. last, but not least, the nation 
must take immediate concrete 
action to strengthen human 
capital at the local levels of 
government. different programs 
have sought to improve local 
capacities in such fields as public 
finance, program formulation 
and investment projects, but 
less attention has been given 
to the creation of a modern, 
professional civil workforce 
in colombia´s subnational 
units. despite recognition that 
clientelism and cronyism still 
prevail in some municipalities 
and departments (Sanabria, 
2010), few concrete actions 
(either central or regional) 
address these fundamental 
problems. colombia clearly 
needs a unified strategy to 
ensure the adoption of a 
merit-based civil service in 
the territories. enhancing 
the recruitment and selection 
processes of the National civil 
Service commission (cNSc) 
is a key step in any effort 
to create a professional civil 
service, with the input of the 
administrative department of 
the public function (dafp) 
and the higher School of 
public administration (eSap) 
(Sanabria et al, 2014). The 
creation of a formalized, 
merit-based public service, 
like the other topics discussed 
above, requires a bottom-
up approach that takes into 
account the particular traits and 
requirements of the territories, 
as well as their own political and 
administrative processes.
Pablo Sanabria, PhD, is an assistant 
professor in the Alberto Lleras 
Camargo School of Government at 
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia. 
The author would like to thank 
research assistants Nicolás Acevedo 
and Juan Sebastián González for their 
contributions.
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Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff delivers a speech during a ceremony at the city hall in São Paulo, Brazil, on July 31, 2013. Rousseff announced the 
investment of R$ 8.1 billion (USD 3.5 billion) for urban mobility projects, infrastructure and housing in the city of São Paulo.  
NELSON ALMEIDA/AFP/Getty Images.
14844_SIPA_LACC-hemisphere-magazine.indd   36 7/21/15   3:35 PM
Hemisphere Volume 24 37
Country reports
Brazil: a prime example of  
decentralization – and  
recentralization
By Gretha Burchard
W hile reforms aiming at decentralization have taken place in many 
latin american nations, the case 
of Brazil is particularly interesting. 
The history of Brazil’s government 
system is often referred to as a 
cyclical one, with decentralizing 
and recentralizing regimes taking 
turns in power. today, 30 years 
after the transition from military 
dictatorship to a federal republic, 
decentralization remains an 
important force shaping the 
Brazilian government – as does 
recentralization.
When Brazil first became a 
republic in 1889, it gave states and 
municipalities a high degree of 
autonomy. The country experienced 
two major moves towards 
recentralization in the twentieth 
century, first under the dictatorship 
of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1937) and 
again during the military regime 
(1964-1984). While the first decade 
of the military dictatorship was 
marked by an economic boom, in 
the 1970s an increasing amount of 
debt and inflation led to protests 
and strikes. rapidly increasing 
urbanization was accompanied 
by a dramatic increase in poverty, 
with social movements pushing for 
reforms, a return to democracy and 
regional autonomy.
The election of José Sarney in 
1985 is regarded as the moment 
when democracy returned to Brazil. 
in an effort to reverse the economic 
recession, Sarney decided to fight 
inflation and high external debt 
by following a strict plan of price 
controls and salary reductions. 
While the immediate outcomes 
seemed successful, his plan 
ultimately failed. Brazil faced severe 
economic challenges, including 
hyperinflation, income inequality 
and a weak import substitution 
industrialization program. at the 
same time, the government made 
little headway on social issues such 
as high illiteracy, poverty, infant and 
maternal mortality, violent crime, 
and access to basic sanitation. The 
consequence was a strong public 
reaction against the centralized 
government and increasing pressure 
to decentralize authority to local 
units. Subnational governments and 
regional elites, longing for authority 
over finances and administration, 
played an important role in shaping 
new laws.
in 1988, Brazil passed a new 
constitution that emphasized 
democratization, universal 
rights-based welfare, the 
professionalization of public 
management, federal cooperation 
to reduce regional inequalities, and 
the creation of municipal public 
services. State and municipal 
autonomy increased significantly, 
particularly in the areas of health, 
education and social policy.
The challenges facing Brazil on 
its path to a decentralized form of 
government became obvious soon 
after the promulgation of the new 
constitution. The overall aim was 
high autonomy for local government 
and greater efficiency at all levels, 
but in practice decentralizing 
decision-making power turned 
out to be complicated. The lack of 
accountability and coordination 
between federal, state and 
municipal authorities caused several 
subnational governments to accrue 
major fiscal deficits.
 Brazil’s approximately 5,570 
municipalities are not subdivisions 
of its 26 states, as they are in other 
federal systems; instead, they are 
part of the federation. The 1988 
constitution granted the states 
a number of exclusive powers, 
including control over the criminal 
justice system and police force. 
other responsibilities, such as 
education, health, and economic 
development, are shared between 
state and national governments. 
The municipalities, in turn, share 
all of these responsibilities with the 
national and state level. The only 
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The mayor of Florianopolis, Brazil in Coconut Park for the ninth edition of Prefeitura no Bairro which aims to engage citizens in public administration 
and provide enhanced public services for the general population. DIRCINHA WELTER/Moment/Getty Images.
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area in which they have complete 
responsibility is transport. 
State governments, given 
their stronger political position, 
the lack of a clear separation of 
powers between municipal and 
state authorities, and disparities in 
financial resources, often obtain 
the most advantageous terms when 
negotiating with local government 
units. power struggles have also 
developed between the state and 
federal level, with some federal 
legislators regarding their positions 
as merely a steppingstone to 
becoming governor of their home 
states and therefore privileging them 
in their legislative work. 
in recent years, Brazil has reversed 
some of the autonomy granted to 
states and municipalities, ostensibly 
to prevent further inequality. The 
reversal includes such measures as 
reducing discretionary transfers to 
state and municipal authorities, 
requiring them to publish revenue 
and spending accounts, and making 
public servants legally liable for 
their actions. to some critics, a 
recentralization of powers was 
needed to fight organizational chaos 
as well as corruption and nepotism. 
however, another approach to the 
accountability of local officials has 
been to increase citizen participation 
in the decision-making process. The 
municipality of porto alegre, for 
example, introduced participatory 
budgeting in 1989. By 2007, this 
policy had spread to more than 100 
Brazilian municipalities. a similar 
measure is the establishment of 
local citizen councils.
Specific sectors reflect the trends 
toward de- and recentralization, 
respectively. two sectors often seen 
as success stories are public health 
and education. The new constitution 
establishes universal access to free 
health care, with municipalities 
receiving federal transfers to 
provide health care services. it took 
more than 20 years to make the 
decentralized and universalized 
health care system work effectively, 
but as a result infant and maternal 
mortality rates decreased by 50%; 
life expectancy increased by nine 
years, from 64 to 73 years; and 
universal immunization for most 
major diseases has been achieved.
educational reforms seem to have 
followed a similar trajectory. The 
constitution envisaged universal, 
decentralized education, and 20 
years later the adult literacy rate had 
increased from 75 to 90%. universal 
primary school enrollment is now a 
reality, and the number of primary 
and secondary students leaving 
school has decreased by 50%.
a closer look at the health care 
and education sectors suggests, 
however, that they developed in 
rather different ways. While the 
education sector was always well-
funded at all three government 
levels, the government had severe 
problems distributing health 
care funding effectively. Several 
recentralizing reforms were necessary 
to provide for fairer, more efficient 
and effective service provision. The 
two sectors also differed regarding 
their reform champions. While the 
education reforms were initiated 
and promoted by cabinet ministers 
and other government officials, a 
number of social movements pushed 
for health care reform. Nevertheless, 
both approaches have led to effective 
cooperation by all three levels of 
government and, eventually, to 
successful outcomes benefiting the 
Brazilian people.
equally interesting is the case of 
social welfare policy. due to the 
aforementioned power struggles and 
differing capacities for generating 
revenue, regional inequalities 
increased and poorer governments 
were more dependent on the federal 
government to finance the provision 
of services. to address these 
problems, several constitutional 
amendments reversed some of the 
autonomy that had been granted to 
subnational governments. targeted 
conditional cash transfer programs 
had first been implemented at the 
local level, but in the late 1990s the 
federal government began issuing 
monthly payments directly to 
financially underprivileged citizens. 
The reason for the centralization 
was the urgent need to find efficient 
ways of dealing with extreme 
poverty while at the same time 
preventing pork barrel politics at the 
local level. The new policies led to a 
recentralization of decision-making 
power and implementation at the 
federal level. 
a prime example of a conditional 
cash transfer program is the “Bolsa 
família.” it provides poor families 
with cash transfers if their children 
attend school and have regular 
health checkups. The money 
comes from the federal level, but 
the success of the program relies 
on well-functioning cooperation 
between the center and the 
municipalities; therefore, it can 
be regarded both as an example of 
recentralization, on the one hand, 
and of successful collaboration 
between municipalities and the 
federal government, on the other. 
The program has been criticized 
for “only” distributing money 
without looking for alternatives 
for generating income and 
employment, but it is also praised 
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for having contributed to the social 
empowerment of women and the 
reduction of inequality and poverty. 
one important outcome of 
fiscal decentralization has been 
the increase in local government 
capacity. in the 1990s, Brazil 
made tax collection at the local 
level compulsory. The stable 
decentralization of tax resources 
has benefited municipalities and 
states. ten years after the new 
constitution was promulgated, own 
local revenue had increased from 0.7 
to 1.6% of Gdp, exceeding federal 
constitutional transfers. The federal 
government levied 22.9% of the 
Gdp and the states, 9.5%. in 2001, 
local governments managed 12.5% 
percent of Brazil’s total public 
revenue, considering own revenue 
and main constitutional transfers. 
adding federal grants, municipal 
governments administered 15.5% 
of total public revenue. on average, 
local governments made a successful 
effort to raise their own revenue by 
modernizing their fiscal systems, 
changing their methods of property 
value evaluation, and increasing 
their service activity. 
in sum, 26 years after the 
promulgation of Brazil’s new 
constitution, reforms in the health, 
education and welfare sectors 
have had clear positive results. 
Some issues, however, such as the 
lack of alternatives for generating 
income and employment, have 
not been successfully tackled. one 
striking feature of Brazil has been 
its deep-rooted inequality. While 
inequality has decreased, it still 
persists and affects local resources 
and local governments’ capability to 
implement policies, and thus, the 
nation’s democracy. 
in the last two years, Brazil has 
seen two major waves of public 
protest, both of which addressed 
– albeit with different objectives 
– the problem of inequality. Some 
of the protesters’ demands have 
already been granted. What happens 
next remains to be seen, but these 
developments raise hope that Brazil 
could slowly be finding its way 
toward a more equal society. Both 
decentralizing and recentralizing 
tendencies have played crucial roles 
in this process.
Gretha Burchard is a PhD Candidate 
in Public Administration at Florida 
International University.
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promises and risks: Challenges to the 
decentralization agenda in Chile
By José Inostroza Lara and Javier Fuenzalida Aguirre 
c
hile has one of the most 
successful records of 
social, economic and 
democratic development 
in latin america. 
over the last 25 years, the country 
has implemented public policies that 
expand coverage of basic services 
and has maintained impeccable 
and efficient fiscal discipline. The 
mortality index has been reduced 
and poverty has decreased by 65%, 
while life expectancy and the quality 
and coverage of education have all 
increased.
These improvements have 
brought with them more 
sophisticated and complex public 
demands. chile is experiencing 
a true civil revolution, with 
citizens calling for public policies 
that address income inequality 
and the quality of education. 
accompanying these demands 
are calls for improved democracy 
with increased public participation 
in the decision-making process, 
and greater recognition of and 
respect for sexual and reproductive 
rights. These demands, particularly 
Chile is experiencing a true civil revolution, with citizens demanding public policies that address income inequality and the quality of education. 
Students and teachers march in the streets of  Valparaiso, Chile during a protest to demand public education on May 14, 2015. For four years, Chilean 
students have taken to the streets to demand high-quality, free public education and an end to the current system of private financing.  
MARCELO BENITEZ/Latincontent/Getty Images.
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those regarding democracy and 
citizen participation, are linked to 
the deficit in the distribution of 
territorial power and authority. in 
many circles, decentralization is 
considered key to addressing these 
problems. 
for the last two decades, however, 
chile’s decentralization has been 
insufficiently dynamic. a few 
policies stand out – the creation of 
municipalities (1989), the direct 
election of mayors (1992), and laws 
addressing local civil servant incomes 
and local personnel management – 
but on the whole, the decentralization 
process can be characterized as a sum 
of relatively isolated, formalistic and 
low-impact initiatives. 
The failed experience of 
municipal administration of public 
education serves as an important 
example of a poorly designed and 
implemented decentralization 
policy. advances in regionalization 
have also been mediocre, despite 
the 1992 creation of regional 
councils (coreS) and regional 
governments (GoreS). The 
current institutional framework 
has not provided the GoreS 
with sufficient tools to lead and 
coordinate the development of 
public policies in their territory 
and relegates their leadership to an 
intendente, a representative of the 
central government. in 2013, chile 
finally passed a reform providing 
for democratic election of coreS 
representatives.
considering this modest 
progress, a 2014 government 
commission offered the following 
recommendations: 1) the 
democratic election of intendants; 
2) greater involvement of 
subnational governments in raising 
revenues and determining expenses; 
3) the transfer of functions to the 
subnational level; 4) strengthening 
of subnational management; and 
5) greater citizen participation and 
democratic control.
The imminent deepening of 
decentralization policy has set off 
alarms in political and techno-
bureaucratic sectors, which warn 
that the process will jeopardize the 
efficiency and effectiveness of service 
delivery and the country’s famed 
fiscal stringency. Key questions 
include: how to enjoy the benefits of 
decentralization without threatening 
the gains derived from the country’s 
fiscal rigor? With political power 
distributed geographically, how 
can basic national standards in 
the delivery of public services be 
assured? and last, how can the 
national goveernment guarantee the 
efficient design and implementation 
of public policies made at the local 
level? to answer these questions, the 
next section analyzes the country’s 
proposed decentralization agenda, the 
risks of inadequate implementation, 
and possible safeguards against 
potential problems.
The presidential Commission  
on decentralization: proposals 
and reality
The commission’s 
recommendations are 
multidimensional and address each 
separate element of decentralization. 
in the area of political 
decentralization, the commission 
recommends the democratic 
election of intendants, who are 
currently presidential appointees, 
by 2016. in the administrative 
sphere, it recommends transferring 
management of several national 
public services to the GoreS, 
with binding contracts to aid in 
coordination between different levels 
of government. in fiscal matters, the 
presidential commission proposes 
a significant increase in revenues 
and autonomous spending for 
GoreS and municipalities. it also 
proposes a new regional revenue 
act authorizing the GoreS to 
issue debt and borrow up to 7% of 
their budget. The act would include 
an investment fund for those 
areas lagging in the administrative 
decentralization process. to 
strengthen local and regional 
capacities, the commision suggests 
incentives to attract more human 
capital and speed development in 
science and technology. finally, with 
regard to citizen participation and 
democratic control, it proposes the 
facilitation and creation of political 
parties at the regional level.
Given the current state of public 
discussion of these proposals, 
political incentives at the national 
level seem insufficient to implement 
this agenda. When it comes to 
decentralization, chile has a long 
tradition of incrementalism and 
formalistic reforms that are more 
symbolic than substantive. any 
effective action must include 
both incentives and operational 
mechanisms that will lessen the 
fears of centralist sectors. reformers, 
therefore, should aim at an enabling 
sequence that focuses on the long-
term consolidation of reforms 
based on the nation’s history of 
incrementalism. a series of regional 
political reforms is also needed to 
facilitate these decentralization 
efforts. to address these issues, we 
recommend the following: 
1. Subnational political leadership 
to initiate regional democracy. 
The first elected intendants 
could coopt the regional 
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bureaucracy to their individual 
electoral interests. to do so, 
they would have to compensate 
the figures who pose the initial 
challenge to elected authorities, 
create effective social control 
systems, and maintain national 
controls on the performance 
and integrity of regional 
authorities.
2. analysis of which services to 
transfer gradually and which 
should remain in the central 
government’s domain. lack of 
experience, technical capacity 
and other factors may result 
in a relaxation of technical 
standards as well as other 
performance measurement 
standards. transferring services 
will require a definition of 
“national standards,” a topic 
chile has not developed 
sufficiently to date.
3. a system to distinguish 
between types of subnational 
spending: a) ongoing 
expenditures less prone to 
changes in national fiscal 
policy (fixed financing); and 
b) financing for projects or 
utilities subject to changes 
in national macrofiscal 
policy (flexible and dynamic 
financing). The chilean 
government has an effective 
and well-designed system 
for managing the rate and 
direction of spending. The 
Budget directive (dipreS) 
has particularly effective 
staff and is built on a strong 
foundation of human capital. 
increasing autonomy in 
spending and income at 
the subnational levels could 
generate a deficit in this 
capacity and an eventual loss of 
fiscal efficiency. distinguishing 
between spending types 
is especially important 
considering that few regions 
in chile are financially self-
sufficient, making national 
financial support mechanisms 
necessary for the long-term.
4. professional and transparent 
mechanisms to recruit, select, 
retain, train and evaluate 
public personnel. chile does 
not have an effective civil 
service system for subnational 
government officials. Such a 
system should be a requirement 
for the delivery of more 
resources and authority from 
the central to the subnational 
governments.
5. enhanced post-performance 
evaluation of subnational 
decisions, with the possible 
creation of a new agency to 
evaluate public policies. 
6. Voluntary associations between 
GoreS and municipalities 
for some specific services. 
chile already has initiatives 
along this line, including the 
aggregation of demands for 
the purchase of medicines and 
shared software repositories. 
chile has a relatively small 
population and a great deal 
of land, making it likely that 
national economies of scale 
will be lost at the subnational 
level. collaboration between 
regional governments and 
municipalities could mitigate 
this problem. 
7. effective compensatory 
programs to support regional 
capabilities and ensure greater 
equity among subnational 
units. The development gap 
between regions poses a major 
threat to decentralization 
efforts in chile, with many 
measures that promote greater 
revenue generation – and 
autonomy at the regional level 
– favoring those regions with 
mining potential.
Conclusion
moving forward with 
decentralization is critical to chile’s 
future development. one of the 
principles that should govern the 
design of decentralization policy 
is the development of regional 
capacity for resource generation 
and control, and compliance with 
national standards. developing 
this capacity should be viewed 
not as a barrier to the dynamism 
of the country’s decentralization 
process, but rather as a way 
to contribute to greater depth 
and sustainability in policy. 
Subnational governments need to 
learn to drive their development 
with greater autonomy, with the 
national government exercising 
its irreplaceable capacity to ensure 
a global outlook. a balanced and 
sophisticated design will ensure a 
positive outlook for the future.
José Inostroza Lara is a part-
time professor in the Department 
of Industrial Engineering at the 
University of Chile and Director of 
the IDB/Chilean Ministry of Finance 
State Modernization Program.
Javier Fuenzalida Aguirre is a 
researcher at the Center for Public 
Systems in the Industrial Engineering 
Department at the University of 
Chile and a PhD student in Rutgers 
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Latin america is currently experiencing a “re-centralization” cycle, reversing the municipal empowerment trend of 
the last three decades. following 
cohen and peterson, countries 
explore and experience various 
forms of decentralization: spatial, 
market-oriented, political and 
administrative. The first limits the 
concentration of development in 
a few territorial enclaves, while 
the second encourages the transfer 
of services traditionally provided 
by the state to the private sector. 
political decentralization proposes 
a redistribution of power and 
a new democratic legitimacy 
in favor of local communities. 
administrative decentralization 
implies the devolution of resources 
and decision-making capacity to 
territorial governments, enabling 
them to provide public and social 
services and carry out public works. 
decentralization in latin 
america traditionally involves 
the political and administrative 
dimensions of the process. a 
quarter-century ago, it was a major 
topic on the regional agenda, not 
only at all levels of government, 
but also at academic institutions, 
international agencies, political 
parties on both the left and right, 
decentralization and  
recentralization in Latin america
By Daniel Cravacuore
L o o K I n G  f o r W a r d
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and civil society organizations, 
in countries large and small. The 
concept has manifested itself 
in constitutional and legislative 
reforms that promote the popular 
election of local authorities and the 
transfer of skills and resources to 
strengthen municipal autonomy.
a brief history of decentralization
latin america’s decentralization 
process was initiated in 1980 with 
the direct election of mayors and 
councilors in peru, followed by the 
first direct elections for mayors and 
local parliamentarians in colombia 
(1986), Bolivia (1987) and ecuador 
(1988).  By the end of the decade, 
many latin american local 
authorities were being elected by 
universal suffrage.  it was a time of 
democratic normalization, of trust 
in institutions and belief in civic 
participation.  in just over a decade, 
countries across the region regained 
full democracy: ecuador (1979), 
peru (1980), honduras (1982), 
Bolivia (1982), argentina (1983), el 
Salvador (1984), Nicaragua (1984), 
uruguay (1984), Brazil (1985), 
Guatemala (1986), panama (1989), 
paraguay (1989) and chile (1990).  
a second wave of decentralization 
followed in countries including el 
Salvador (1999), Guatemala (2002), 
panama (2004) and dominican 
republic (2003).
in 1979, the chilean government 
promoted the decentralization 
of health policy and, two years 
later, education services, serving 
as the immediate predecessor for 
other countries that initiated the 
transfer of various competencies. 
These reforms responded to 
the subsidiarity principle – a 
fundamental tenet of the european 
union designed to ensure that 
power is exercised as close to 
the citizen as possible – and 
the assumption that service 
delivery at the local level was 
more effective and efficient. This 
involved creating new mechanisms 
for intergovernmental transfers 
in favor of the municipal and 
subnational levels. in short, 
decentralization found its 
momentum in the strengthening 
of emerging democracies through 
citizen participation and finding 
innovative ways to solve part of the 
state crisis.
Thirty years of decentralization 
efforts allow us to take stock of 
the movement’s achievements. The 
inclusion of municipal concerns in 
the public agenda transformed local 
governments in terms of policy 
implementation and innovation, 
leadership building and electoral 
competition. municipalities became 
the arenas of public debate and 
the intersection of civic and public 
policy demands that pushed for 
open and democratic governments. 
The gains have been significant, 
but the process of decentralization 
is still unfinished. Not all of the 
desired results have been achieved: 
Some reforms were never deployed, 
and the policy’s political appeal 
was based more on symbolism or 
international pressure than a firm 
belief in its advantages.
four debates have emerged from 
this perceived failure. unitary 
countries argue over the degree 
of empowerment of intermediate 
levels of government, while socialist 
countries debate radical change 
with an underlying desire to build 
new state organizations. a third 
debate is the fate of territorial 
royalties for the exploitation of 
natural resources, with proposed 
limits on or suppression of local 
capacity. finally, a fourth debate 
involves the reduction of regular 
resources for municipalities 
and their replacement with 
discretionary transfers from the 
state or state enterprises in an 
effort to limit local autonomy 
to determine priorities and 
allocate resources.
recentralization in Latin america
recent research suggests that, 
beyond national nuances, the 
region is witnessing the beginnings 
of a reversal of administrative 
decentralization and its consequent 
impact on policy. uruguay’s 2010 
law of municipal decentralization 
and citizen participation, which 
created a third level of government 
below the department level, was the 
last reformist law passed in latin 
america. in unitary countries, 
decentralization efforts seem to 
have shifted to a parsimonious 
process not without doubts 
and setbacks. in larger federal 
countries, the process appears to 
have stopped without any real 
prospects for transformation. in 
this context, some critics propose 
recovering the powers transferred, 
and international organizations, 
political parties, and municipal 
organizations are abandoning 
their efforts to encourage 
decentralization. municipalities are 
experiencing a crisis characterized 
by low-level local participation, 
conflicts with national governments 
(often followed by cooptation), and 
a lack of unity.
The reduction of regular budget 
transfers to local governments is 
well-known: Growing national 
budgets (driven by raw material 
exports) provide national 
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governments with more funds to 
transfer extraordinary resources 
and use them politically to 
discipline mayors who fall out 
of line. moreover, concrete 
limitations have been placed on 
citizen participation, the very 
notion of which clashes with the 
historical political practices and 
authoritarian behavior of many 
political leaders in the region. 
recentralization has found few 
major obstacles to limiting political 
decentralization and, with it, 
local democracy, by imposing 
restrictions on routine electoral 
processes. two broad ideological 
positions sustain this process: a 
drive toward state recentralization, 
and an emphasis on the fiscal costs 
of decentralization. ironically, the 
same neo-liberal and progressive 
sectors that favored decentralization 
in the 1980s and 1990s support 
recentralization today.
The starting point of this trend 
was a ruling of the constitutional 
chamber of the Supreme court 
of the Bolivarian republic of 
Venezuela in 2001 declaring 
that national legislation takes 
precedence over state law in 
regulating municipal organization. 
until then, the government 
of hugo chávez had held out 
some promise of decentralization 
(including an acknowledgement 
in the 1999 constitution that 
“decentralization, as national 
policy, should strengthen 
democracy, bring power to the 
people and create optimum 
conditions for both the exercise of 
democracy and the effective and 
efficient delivery of government 
commitments”), but it soon 
shifted to regular subjugation 
of local autonomy. This process 
has occurred in a context of 
false consensus concerning 
the importance of municipal 
government. The most relevant 
public actors (e.g. political leaders, 
entrepreneurs, academics) do not 
hesitate to laud local governments’ 
role in development, but they are 
notably silent when the transfer of 
obligations or resources is involved. 
The problem is compounded by 
the habitual failure of community 
leaders (mayors, councilors, and 
representatives of municipal 
associations) to confront regional 
restrictions. This may be a result 
of the fact that local government 
office often is only a steppingstone 
on the path to national political 
ambitions.
possible consequences of 
recentralization
This article has focused on the 
emergence of a centralization cycle 
in latin america that reverses the 
municipal empowerment of the last 
three decades. originating early 
in the century, recentralization 
seems to have become a trend that 
transcends ideological differences. 
it is manifested most drastically 
among socialist governments, 
which seek to subordinate local 
authorities with hierarchical 
logic and limit the expression of 
democratic opposition. other 
governments, while respectful 
of the popular will, justify 
recentralization by citing the 
alleged inefficiency and corruption 
of local governments (as if this 
phenomenon were limited only to 
the local level). a more elaborate 
argument points to the need for 
territorial equity and uniform 
protection of rights.
recentralization does not mean 
returning to the political realities of 
three decades ago. The dimension 
most affected is likely to be 
administrative, but discretionary 
cuts in budgetary transfers will 
also have an impact on the 
political sphere, limiting the role 
of local leaders, such as mayors, by 
transforming them into mere agents 
of the central government’s will. in 
most cases, citizen participation is 
still too weak to provide an effective 
counterweight and collides with 
traditional authoritarian political 
practices and behaviors. moreover, 
as already noted, mayors and 
municipal organizations themselves 
seem little inclined to confront or 
fight regional restrictions. taken 
together, these developments raise 
doubts about the future of local 
democracy in latin america.
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